

**SPS/STDF/OECD WORKSHOP ON  
GOOD PRACTICE IN SPS-RELATED TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

Background research has been funded by the STDF for consideration at the workshop on good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation, which is being organized jointly by the SPS Committee, Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in Geneva on 6 October 2008.

The STDF research is based on replies from WTO Members and OECD Development Assistance Committee Contact Points to the request for information on good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation, circulated to the SPS Committee in document G/SPS/GEN/816 and G/SPS/GEN/816/Add.1. In this information request, Members were asked to identify one or more SPS-related technical assistance projects which could be considered as examples of good practice in one or more of the following regions: Central America, East Africa and the Greater Mekong Delta Sub-region<sup>1</sup>. A total of 24 projects were nominated by 19 organizations in response to this request.

In-depth research has been undertaken on the projects nominated as examples of good practice in response to G/SPS/GEN/816 by a team of three consultants: Mr Jason Hafmeister, Mr Spencer Henson and Mr Cornelis van der Meer.

Attached is the report of Mr Spencer Henson. This report examines the projects submitted as examples of good practice in the East Africa region.

This report has been prepared under the consultant's own responsibility and is without prejudice to the WTO Secretariat, the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO.

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<sup>1</sup> The following countries were included in the research: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama for Central America; Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda for East Africa; and Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam for the Greater Mekong Delta Sub-region.

# **Good Practice in SPS-Related Technical Cooperation East Africa Region Report**

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September 2008

**This report was prepared for the STDF/OECD Workshop on Good Practices in SPS-related Technical Cooperation, 6 October 2008, Geneva. It reflects the views of the authors alone and does not represent the views of the STDF or any of its partner agencies or donors**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### ***Introduction***

1. This report is one of the three regional assessments of good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation. It examines the perspectives of beneficiaries across a series of case study projects regarding elements of good practice with a focus on project design and implementation, and on the resulting outputs and impacts. While providing specific cases of good practice, a synthesis and comparison of the findings aims to present more general perspectives.

2. Here the focus is on the East Africa region, specifically Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In each of these countries, the ability to comply with SPS measures in key export markets has a critical influence on trade performance, alongside other competitiveness factors. Thus, attempts to exploit potentially lucrative markets for agricultural and food products, and in particular higher-value non-traditional products, as part of rural poverty alleviation and export diversification strategies, are closely tied to efforts towards SPS capacity-building.

### ***Overview of methodology***

3. The case study projects studied in this research were nominated by donors in response to a request for information on good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation, distributed to WTO Members and OECD Development Assistance Committee contact points in January 2008. The survey requested information on SPS-related technical cooperation projects which could be considered to represent examples of good practice. Through this process, six projects were proposed for the analysis.

4. A variety of information sources were used to collect both factual and attitudinal/experiential information on each of the six projects. First, for four of the six case study projects, donors had completed a standard questionnaire requesting basic factual information on the project. Second, contact was made through email with personnel in the donors and/or implementers associated with each of the six case study projects requesting supporting documentation and further information and perspectives on elements of good practice. Third, a review was undertaken of project documents obtained directly from donors in response to a request from the STDF and/or the study team, and an internet search. Fourth, extended telephone and/or email discussions were held with some personnel involved with project administration, design and/or implementation. Finally, a series of in-depth interviews were held in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda over the period 28 July to 15 August 2008. The interviews were conducted face-to-face using a standard semi-structured guide.

5. The starting point for defining benchmarks or indicators of the impact and effectiveness of SPS-related technical cooperation was a framework for assessing good practice in this area, compiled for the STDF. This framework highlighted issues and problems in defining indicators and in obtaining reliable measures of impacts and effectiveness. In the analysis a distinction was made between the specific effects on SPS capacity, based around the concept of a hierarchy of inter-related functions, and the resulting higher-order impacts, for example on trade performance and/or poverty levels and livelihoods.

6. Although the collection and analysis of data largely proceeded with relative ease, certain problems were encountered that served to impede the analysis, as well as to limit the wider validity of the findings. Most notably: 1) the information set available for each of the six case study projects differed both in terms of the amount and type of information available; 2) in some cases donors and/or project implementers were not able to provide detailed information on project design, implementation and/or impacts; 3) not all project beneficiaries were willing to provide their personal views and experiences; and 4) the scope and structure of the six case study projects was quite narrow

and excluded a number of key areas of SPS-related technical cooperation, restricting the wider validity of the findings.

### Overview of projects

7. The six projects examined by the project were as follows:

- *Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP)*: This was a large-scale EU-funded project that became operational in 2001. The PIP programme was established by the EU at the request of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in response to concerns over the potential negative effects on fresh produce exports of the harmonization of Member State controls on pesticides in food, and in particular the establishment of EU-wide maximum residue levels (MRLs). Specific activities included the provision of information, training of producers and guidance in audit and certification processes and other activities driven by the specific needs of the beneficiaries, establishment of sectoral task forces, training of local service providers and staff in laboratories and research institutes, enhancement of national control capacity related to trade in fresh produce, etc.
- *East Africa Phytosanitary Information Committee (EAPIC)*: This was a USAID-funded project that aimed to establish a network of National Plant Protection Organizations (NPPOs) across East Africa and infrastructure for the collection and sharing of data on plant pests and diseases. In turn, the project has worked towards the compilation of pest lists for key export commodities and enhancement of capacity to undertake pest risk assessments (PRAs).
- *Capacity-Building Needs Assessments*: This FAO project aimed to test a comprehensive framework for assessing capacity-building needs of developing countries in the area of food control and to undertake related needs assessments for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Reports on these assessments included action plans that were reviewed through stakeholder consultations in each country and subsequently approved by the respective national governments.
- *Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety*: This project was undertaken by SWEDAC as part of the ongoing International Training Programme (ITP) of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The course on which the case study focuses was undertaken in January/February 2007 with the theme Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety. Participants drawn from a number of African countries were exposed to examples of good practice relating to food safety management through visits to food companies, public food safety control facilities, etc. After the course participants completed a group exercise over a six month period, focused on drafting a national action plan. This was presented at a follow-up seminar six months later.
- *Global Salm-Surv Training Programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa*: This project was initiated as the result of a broader needs assessment on infrastructure for laboratory-based salmonella surveillance by the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Salm-Surv (GSS). The focus here is on a basic training course in this area offered in October/November 2007. The course included theoretical aspects of surveillance and laboratory testing and practical laboratory work, as well as practical case studies.
- *Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea*: This study undertaken by UNCTAD aimed to estimate the costs of compliance in Tanzania associated with SPS requirements in export markets for tropical products and to

develop a standard methodology for this purpose. The study was implemented by the World Bank and undertaken by an external consultant. A local workshop disseminated the final results.

### ***Good practice in project design***

8. Across beneficiaries in the private and public sectors there was strong support for the design of the *PIP*. The project was seen as addressing a real problem – the potential threat to exports of fresh produce to the EU. While it was recognized that the activities of the *PIP* were constrained by its design, the *PIP* was considered more flexible than other projects to which respondents had been exposed. One of the recurring themes in discussions with beneficiaries was the level of engagement of the *PIP* with the private sector; this was considered a positive attribute of the project among respondents in both the private and public sectors. The long duration of the *PIP* was also considered a strength; the fact that the project had secured funding and a defined schedule of activities for five years was seen as presenting real opportunities for capacity enhancement.

9. The *EAPIC* represents a more traditional project in the area of SPS-related technical cooperation, but was widely seen by beneficiaries as representing a positive example of donor support to the development of phytosanitary capacity. A number of the beneficiaries saw themselves as having a role in the original genesis of the *EAPIC*. Indeed, by many it was not considered a project *per se*, but rather that USAID was supporting the development of a new institutional structure that belonged to NPPOs in the region. Beneficiaries highlighted the fact that the *EAPIC*'s design enabled it to adapt and change as priorities were identified, needs shifted and capacities developed.

10. Broadly speaking, the *Capacity-Building Needs Assessments* in the area of food control undertaken by FAO were seen as externally led exercises over which beneficiaries had little influence. While beneficiaries did not necessarily see themselves as partners in these assessments, the exercise itself was seen as valuable for setting a platform for future actions. Further, the fact that they were based on a standard assessment tool and had been undertaken by an international consultant paired with a national consultant was seen as giving credibility.

11. The *Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety* was offered following a process of needs assessment and priority-setting among developing countries that have an active engagement with SIDA. Many participants suggested that the course presented examples of good practice in that the aims and objectives were clearly articulated and communicated to potential participants, the course was scheduled well ahead of time, the course was designed to enable participants to engage with one another and instructors and there was a follow-up exercise and meeting once the course had been completed.

12. The *Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa* was generally considered to follow more of the traditional mode of training courses in the area of SPS-related capacity-building. For participants, the real innovation in the course was the combination of theoretical and practical aspects in the design and implementation of the course.

13. The *Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea* by UNCTAD was initiated following a generic request for standards-related technical assistance from the beneficiary countries. It developed and followed a standard methodology across the three study countries contributing to greater rigour in the estimates that were derived, engendering confidence among policy-makers in their validity. However, little was known about how and why the methods employed had been used.

### *Good practice in project implementation*

14. Overall, the implementation of the *PIP* was evaluated positively by beneficiaries, indeed it was considered to stand out as an example of good practice. In particular, efforts to engage with a wide range of stakeholders across the public and private sectors and at both the individual and collective levels were lauded. Further, activities had been adjusted over time according to ongoing learning processes and identified (and revised) priorities. The *PIP* employed a demand-driven approach which enabled the support provided to be adapted to the needs of particular beneficiaries, who were also able to play a role in designing the assistance they received. At the same time, the fact that beneficiaries had to apply for support and write formal applications meant that there was some upfront cost and effort, that eliminated those who did not have the basic minimum level of pre-existing capacity. Support to industry task forces and the development of local service provider capacity was also seen as positive.

15. The *EAPIC* has been operational for a period of two years and over this time evolved from a project focused on the relatively simple task of developing lists of plant pests and diseases of trade significance for East Africa countries to a more complex project that aims to harmonize phytosanitary controls with those of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). This reflects the growing confidence of the member NPPOs in the context of financial and technical support from USAID. The *EAPIC* has apparently made great efforts to engender the active participation of member NPPOs and to promote ownership of the project. Inevitably, the *EAPIC* has run into implementation problems when it has come up against prevailing capacity constraints beyond the scope of the project itself. The project has now developed to a stage where additional partners have offered ongoing technical and/or financial support.

16. The *Capacity-Building Needs Assessments* project successfully implemented the assessment framework developed by FAO and defined national action plans that were approved in each of the study countries. The use of an international consultant – that ensured consistency in the implementation of the evaluation framework and asked difficult questions – and a local consultant conversant with local conditions and with extensive knowledge and experience of the national context, worked well. While implementation of the studies was directed from outside the study countries, the stakeholder consultations enabled local input.

17. The *Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety* course was of significant value to participants. In most areas, the subject matter of the course was judged to have reached the defined objectives, while the mode of delivery facilitated interaction amongst the body of participants. Beneficiaries were presented with hands-on exercises, while there was constant monitoring and interaction with trainers. There is evidence that beneficiaries have been able to directly apply the skills they have learnt, both through the extended project and in their day-to-day work.

18. The *Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa* was well received by participants, who were able to apply at least some of the knowledge they had accrued in their day-to-day work. The combination of theoretical and practical training was considered a good innovation.

19. The *Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea* was successfully concluded in 2005. The research team was not able to gather any substantive information on the manner in which the study was undertaken, although a review of the study report suggests it applied rigorous methods that could be employed in other studies of this type.

***Good practice in project outputs and impacts***

20. The direct focus of the *PIP* was to enhance food safety capacity. Of all of the case study projects, the *PIP* is the most comprehensive and is the only one directed at capacity-building in the public and private sectors. It is also unique in the scope of the interventions employed. The most immediate and wide-ranging impact of the *PIP* has been to create awareness regarding the importance of food safety to export competitiveness and the need for enhancement of capacity directed at compliance with regulatory requirements and private standards in the EU. It not only disseminated information on emerging issues and changes in regulatory requirements and private standards on an ongoing basis, but was also active in translating this information into practical guides that could be implemented by exporters and their suppliers. The *PIP* has been instrumental in developing specific elements of food safety capacity in the public and private sectors, including the first private certification service provider in the region, enhancement of regulatory systems for the approval and control of pesticides, upgrading of exporter food safety systems and implementation of good practices in testing laboratories. Many beneficiaries pointed to the fact that these initiatives had been translated into better and more rigorous food safety controls. While the broader aim of the *PIP* was to build the long-term competitiveness of private enterprises in the horticultural sector, it is difficult to attribute any changes in this regard directly to the project.

21. The *EAPIC* project focuses solely on public sector capacity, specifically relating to the control of plant pests and diseases. The project seeks to build institutional capacity across East Africa to undertake pest risk assessments that meet the needs of export markets, notably for the USA. Thus, while having a higher-level objective of boosting exports as one of its objectives, its primary impact is seen as enhancing specific SPS-related capacities. The project has been successful in this regard, establishing online databases and separate servers in project countries, which will ultimately be linked to a regional server, and boosting capacity to undertake pest risk assessments, which was demonstrated by US approval for imports of three items of fresh produce from Kenya.

22. Capacity assessments were successfully completed in all study countries, although there were differences in the response of governments to the *Capacity-Building Needs Assessment* project and the degree to which this project has induced further action towards enhancement of food safety capacity. Many of the problems faced are beyond the control of the project.

23. The *Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety* course was directly aimed at guiding the enhancement of food safety capacity, rather than in and of itself bringing about such enhancements. Upon completion of the training course, participants returned to their countries and worked for six months on a draft policy document which they later presented at a workshop. The progress and status of this draft policy varied across the study countries, but was generally well received and influenced the formulation of national policies on food safety capacity enhancement.

24. The target impact of the *Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa* was the enhancement of a specific element of food safety capacity, notably related to laboratory practices for microbial pathogens. While many participants in the course were constrained in their ability to apply the skills imparted by this programme due to infrastructural weaknesses in their country, most were of the view that their skills and expertise had been enhanced appreciably. Further, a number of participants noted that they had shared information and data with other laboratories through an informal network that developed between participants.

25. *The Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea* produced a rigorous study of the costs of compliance with export market food safety requirements for tropical projects in Tanzania. It is not apparent whether this study has had appreciable impacts in Tanzania.

## Conclusions, recommendations and key lessons learned

26. The key findings from analysis of the six case studies are as follows:

- ***Demand- versus supply-driven technical cooperation:*** The design and implementation of projects should engage potential beneficiaries in processes of needs assessment, acting to design technical cooperation around prevailing local capacity, instill local ownership in capacity-building efforts and building capacity in needs identification, appraisal and priority-setting. However, demand-driven modes of technical cooperation are not necessarily appropriate where prevailing levels of capacity are weak, SPS requirements in export markets are changing rapidly and/or emergencies arise.
- ***Needs assessment:*** In many technical cooperation projects some form of needs assessment is undertaken, whether involving the beneficiary, donor, or both. Too often the form taken by this assessment is not clear and quite different approaches are employed across projects, creating inconsistencies, increasing the transaction costs for beneficiaries and impeding the employment of good practice. Consistent frameworks can be highly beneficial in this context.
- ***Flexibility:*** Critical to the efficacy of capacity-building efforts is the need for interventions to be flexible in their scope and modes of delivery. Thus, circumstances may change and priorities shift over time, while needs and capacities may differ across multiple recipients of assistance. The need for flexibility also applies to the definition and assessment of intended impacts.
- ***Practitioner networks:*** A number of the projects reviewed above have created practitioner networks among beneficiaries, whether as an intended impact or as a secondary consequence. In all cases these have emerged as valuable outputs that empower beneficiaries, engender local ownership and provide an ongoing mechanism for capacity enhancement.
- ***Active learning:*** A welcome trend in technical cooperation projects that impart knowledge and skills through training is the use of more active modes of learning. These include engagement of students in dialogue around learning objectives, problem-based learning and extended project work. Active engagement of beneficiaries in capacity-building is also critical to effective cooperation and sustainability.
- ***Linking skills development to practice:*** Training programmes work most effectively when linked to the specific needs and day-to-day duties of beneficiaries. While it is difficult to customise training to the needs of individuals, linkages with practice can be achieved through project work and other practical exercises.
- ***Selection of beneficiaries:*** The efficacy of training programmes at enhancing capacity reflects not only the content and mode of delivery but also the choice of participants. This also applies to more comprehensive support programmes such as the PIP. Making the intended impacts of technical cooperation clear and explicit upfront is critical here.
- ***Establishing local capacity-building capacity:*** Investment in local providers of training and consultancy services acts to establish longer-term and sustainable capacity. Further, local service producers are better positioned to communicate, not only because of their command of the local language but also appreciation of cultural issues.
- ***Sequencing and connectivity of capacity-building efforts:*** Critical to the efficacy and sustainability of capacity-building efforts is the sequencing and interconnectivity of capacity-building efforts. This includes access to sources of finance and avoiding overlap and/or non-sequential capacity-building across multiple programmes of technical cooperation. At the

same time, we need to recognize the cumulative impact of technical cooperation projects on capacity-building, such that the individual effects of particular projects may be difficult to discern.

- ***Assessing and monitoring progress:*** While much technical cooperation is focused on enhancing specific aspects of SPS capacity, underlying such objectives are often higher-level impacts, for example on export performance, inclusion of smallholders, etc. A multi-tiered structure of intended impacts is appropriate for most programmes of technical cooperation, especially if they are of limited duration, impacts are lagged and/or attribution problems are significant. At the same time it is critical that beneficiaries are able to monitor and assess their own capacity development.
- ***Role as honest broker:*** While there is a tendency to focus on the direct impacts of technical cooperation on SPS capacity, in some cases one of the key role of external interventions is to act as an honest broker and/or risk taker. Thus, donors and project implementers, as (often) trusted, respected and/or powerful external parties, can act to overcome entrenched local positions and/or to build bridges between stakeholders.
- ***Market distortions:*** Efforts should be made to minimize the market demand and price distorting effects of technical cooperation projects and programmes, for example through cost-sharing and linking support to agreed action plans.
- ***Political support:*** Critical to the success and longer-term sustainability of capacity-building efforts is buy-in by political decisions-makers. Engaging beneficiary countries in assessing the design and implementation of capacity-building efforts can be important in this regard, provided these involve decision-makers at a sufficiently high level. Dissemination of information, including through the media, can also act to create the political impetus to move SPS issues further up the agenda.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. In recent years, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures have become an increasingly prominent issue for global trade in agricultural and food products. Of particular concern is the potential impact that food safety and/or animal and plant health measures can have on the ability of developing countries to gain and/or maintain access to markets for higher-value agricultural and food products, especially in industrialized countries. In part this reflects the growing preponderance of SPS measures, but also the more widespread recognition of the degree and manner in which trade flows can be affected. These concerns are typically greatest for low-income countries that tend to have weak SPS management capacities that can thwart efforts towards export-led agricultural diversification and rural development.

2. Recognition of the SPS management capacity constraints faced by developing countries has served to highlight the role of technical cooperation and other capacity-building support, both from bilateral donors and multilateral development agencies. More generally, greater emphasis is being placed on Aid for Trade, gearing development cooperation to the enhancement of trade capacity that enables developing countries to enhance their international trade performance as a means to economic development. While the vast majority of technical cooperation is directed at overcoming acute compliance problems, often in the context of actual or potential trade problems and disputes, increasing attention is being given to the need for a more strategic focus that enhances fundamental food safety and animal and plant health management capacity and enables developing countries to be more proactive in their responses to evolving SPS standards in global trade. At the same time, it is apparent that there is a need for better coordination of the substantial amounts of technical cooperation that is being provided in this area and for the sharing of experiences in order to identify good practices. The Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) aims to play a role in this regard.

3. The focus on good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation reflects broader concerns about "good" development assistance; that is, what works and what does not? While scaling up of aid is acknowledged to be crucial, it is recognized that enhancement of the effectiveness of any assistance that is given is of equal importance. The efficient and effective delivery of development assistance demands better targeting to capabilities, skills, institutional structures and market incentives in recipient countries. This suggests the need to design, implement and evaluate assistance programmes within the context of specific developing country capacities, while moving away from the traditional donor/recipient relationship. Indeed, the guidelines defined by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness better elucidate the relationship between development partners and aid recipients by explicitly outlining the roles and responsibilities of each and strengthening developing country ownership of the development process. Within these guidelines, and of relevance here, donors are seeking to achieve effective development assistance that promotes ownership, alignment, harmonization and mutual accountability as they apply to sanitary and phytosanitary issues.<sup>2</sup> In turn, a key issue is the extent to which good practice contributes to improvements in SPS compliance and, in turn, increased market access, trade competitiveness, etc.

4. This report is one of the three regional assessments of good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation, each of which focuses on a series of case study projects that have been presented by donors as examples of good practice. In particular, it examines the perspectives of beneficiaries in each of the case study projects regarding elements of good practice, with a focus on project design, implementation, and the resulting outputs and impacts. While providing specific cases of good practice, a synthesis and comparison of the findings aims to present more general perspectives, for example with respect to:

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<sup>2</sup> Gascoigne, D. (2007). *Identification of Parameters for Good Practice and Benchmarks for judging the Impact of SPS-Related Technical Assistance*. Draft Report for the Standards and Trade Development Facility, Geneva.

- Contribution to immediate and/or medium-term improvements in specific areas of SPS capacity, for example increased awareness of SPS measures among government officials and/or in the private sector; adoption of risk-based inspection techniques, establishment and maintenance of disease-free areas, enhanced laboratory testing capacity, etc.
- Contribution to higher-order objectives, for example improved market access, enhanced animal/plant health status, reduction in incidence of food-borne diseases, poverty reduction, etc.
- Innovation and transferability.
- Relevance to national policy and cost-effectiveness.

5. This particular report focuses on the East Africa region, specifically Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In each of these countries, the ability to comply with SPS measures in key export markets has a critical influence on trade performance, alongside other competitiveness factors. Thus, attempts to exploit potentially lucrative markets for agricultural and food products, and in particular higher-value non-traditional products, as part of rural poverty alleviation and export diversification strategies, are closely tied to efforts towards SPS capacity-building. Historically, the predominant focus of concern has been compliance with technical regulations, the official requirements of public authorities in export markets. However, more recently attention has widened to include the parallel role of private standards, for example EurepGAP/GlobalGAP, as dominant buyers have progressively implemented and enforced their own standards.

6. Experiences in the three case study countries highlight the key role that SPS capacity across the public and private sectors, and food safety capacity in particular, plays in facilitating access to export markets for agricultural and food products and in determining competitiveness within those markets. Indeed, across these countries we can see examples where non-compliance with SPS requirements has resulted in exclusion from export markets (for example exports of Nile perch in all three countries) and where compliance with SPS requirements has been the basis of impressive export market performance (for example horticultural products in Kenya). While the actions of the public and private sectors has been critical in establishing the required level of capacity and achieving compliance with export market SPS measures, all three countries have received (and continue to receive) significant levels of technical cooperation. This makes them ideal examples for examining concepts of good practice in this area.

## **II. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY**

### **Selection of case study projects**

7. The case study projects examined below were nominated by donors in response to a request for information on good practice in SPS-related technical cooperation (G/SPS/GEN/816) distributed by the WTO and OECD to WTO Members and OECD Development Assistance Committee contact points in January 2008. The survey requested information on SPS-related technical cooperation projects in the following regions, which could be considered to be examples of good practice:

- Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama).
- East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).
- Greater Mekong Delta Sub-region (Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam).

8. Through this process, six projects which had been implemented in some or all of the three study countries in East Africa were nominated for the analysis:

- Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP) (European Union) (Studied in Kenya and Uganda).
- East Africa Phytosanitary Information Committee (EAPIC) (USAID) (Studied in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).
- Capacity-Building Needs Assessments (FAO) (Studied in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).
- Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety (SWEDAC) (Studied in Tanzania and Uganda).
- Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa (WHO) (Studied in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).
- Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea (UNCTAD) (Studied in Tanzania).

9. Where these projects had been implemented in more than one of the study countries, an attempt was made to compare and contrast experiences across multiple countries. The countries where each project was examined are indicated in parentheses above.

#### **Sources of information**

10. A variety of information sources were used to collect both factual and attitudinal/experiential information on each of the six projects, as follows:

- For four of the six case study projects donors had completed a standard questionnaire requesting basic factual information on the project. This was distributed as part of the G/SPS/GEN/816 document. This questionnaire was not completed for the Pesticides Initiative Programme and the Capacity-Building Needs Assessments. A synthesis of the information provided in these questionnaires is provided in Annex II.
- Contact was made through e-mail with personnel in the donors and/or implementers associated with each of the six case study projects. A request was made for any supporting documentation, including study reports, project designs, evaluations, training programme participant lists, etc. Further, an opportunity was given for personnel involved in administering, designing and/or implementing the project to give their own perspectives on elements of good practice.
- A review was undertaken of project documents obtained directly from the donors in response to a request from the STDF and/or the study team, and an internet search.
- Extended telephone and/or e-mail discussions were held with some personnel involved with project administration, design and/or implementation. These enabled more in-depth perspectives to be obtained prior to the main body of data collection described below.
- In order to canvas the perspectives of beneficiaries of the six projects, a series of in-depth interviews were held in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda over the period 28 July to 15 August 2008. The interviews were conducted face-to-face using a standard semi-structured guide

(Annex III). A list of interviewees is provided in Annex IV. Note that this list excludes interviewees who preferred to remain anonymous.

11. The information obtained through these various means was then synthesised, initially within each project and then across the six case studies.

### **Benchmarks for judging the impact and effectiveness of SPS-related technical cooperation**

12. The starting point for defining benchmarks or indicators of the impact and effectiveness of SPS-related technical cooperation was a framework on assessing good practice in this area, compiled for the STDF.<sup>3</sup> This framework highlights the problems faced in assessing the impacts of a particular technical cooperation project or programme. In this context, particular issues are as follows:

- Often the impacts of a particular technical cooperation project are experienced in the future, and well beyond the timeframe of the project itself. This particularly applies to higher-order objectives which, as a consequence, are often excluded from project evaluations and can be very difficult to attribute.
- Many developing countries, and this certainly applies to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, have received numerous SPS-related technical cooperation projects that may have substantial areas of overlap. This makes any attempt to attribute changes in levels of SPS capacity and/or higher-order impacts to a particular project problematic and prone to significant levels of double-counting.
- In many cases individual technical cooperation projects address a limited number of dimensions of SPS capacity, even within a particular area (for example food safety or animal health), and/or focus on a sub-set of the recognized elements of capacity-building. While it may be possible to identify quite narrow impacts from such projects (for example heightened levels of technical expertise after completion of a training programme), for many projects it certainly draws serious questions about any assessment of higher-order outcomes.
- The projects differed markedly in their scope, making it difficult to compare and contrast impacts and effectiveness across them. Thus, while the PIP (for example) simultaneously addressed a number of capacity constraints impacting fresh produce exporters, the Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa aimed to develop specific skills in laboratory analysis and surveillance. In this context, the measures we would apply to assess the effectiveness of each would be quite different.


13. A distinction is made in assessing the impacts and effectiveness of SPS-related technical cooperation between the specific effects on SPS capacity and the resulting higher-order impacts. With respect to the former, it is necessary to distinguish the multiple and inter-related functions that constitute food safety, animal health and/or plant health management capacity and to recognize that a hierarchy or ordering exists between these. Thus, in a relatively loose sense we apply the hierarchy of SPS management functions presented in Figure 1.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Gascoigne, D. (2007). *Identification of Parameters for Good Practice and Benchmarks for judging the Impact of SPS-Related Technical Assistance*. Draft Report for the Standards and Trade Development Facility, Geneva.

<sup>4</sup> World Bank (2005). *Food Safety and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Country Exports*. World Bank, Washington DC.

**Figure 1: Hierarchy of trade-related SPS management functions**



Source: World Bank (2005)

14. In this hierarchy, the foundation of any SPS management system is awareness and recognition, in both the public and private sectors and from the level of decision-makers to implementers and operatives, of the importance of effective SPS controls to export competitiveness and recognition by each party of their own role in this system. It is unlikely that any system of SPS management can be effective without a broad-based appreciation of the associated functions and roles. The next stage is the application of established risk and quality management practices through the supply chain from production to distribution, most notably HACCP, good manufacturing practice (GMP) and good agricultural practice (GAP). Regulatory action may be required to compel implementation of these practices if there are insufficient market-based incentives to do so in the short to medium term. With broad awareness and common application of good practices, many potential SPS risks can be managed effectively at the farm or firm level. However, there are other risks that are more systemic in nature, and that are not confined to particular production or processing operations, such that they cannot be fully controlled on a decentralized basis and require broader oversight or collective action. This can entail research and analytical functions, surveillance and quarantine systems and emergency management arrangements. Many plant and animal diseases fall into this category. These more technically-demanding functions often require sophisticated skills, specialized equipment and well-defined organizational structures, supported by recurrent funding. Some of these functions need to be legally mandated to ensure that they are implemented appropriately. Finally, at the top of the pyramid is SPS diplomacy, which relates to engagement with the WTO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and IPPC, as well as bilateral relations with trading partners.

15. The higher-order objectives or impacts of SPS-related technical cooperation represent the consequences of enhanced SPS management capacity. Here we distinguish between three higher-level impacts of enhanced SPS management capacity:

- Enhancement of food safety, animal health and/or plant health status, for example reduced incidence of disease, confirmation of disease-free status, etc.
- Enhancement of trade performance in key agricultural and food commodities, including increased volume or value of exports to existing markets, access to new export markets, etc.
- Reduction in levels of poverty/increases in income/livelihood resulting from enhanced trade performance and/or productivity.

16. It should be recognized that, as alluded to above, discerning the impact of particular technical cooperation projects on specific elements and/or overall SPS management capacity is much easier than attributing effects on higher-order consequences. Indeed, many of the projects we examine here have enhancement of specific elements of (lower order) SPS management capacity as their defined objective, although with the implicit objective of contributing to the enhancement of higher-order impacts.

17. It should be recognized that three of the six case study projects explicitly define a series of target impacts and that these should obviously be the starting point in any analysis of effectiveness of technical cooperation. Thus, the PIP aimed to:

- Increase awareness of food safety and good agricultural practices among farmers.
- Improve market access for exporting firms as a result of certification.
- Reduce pesticide residues due to adoption of GAP.
- Increase sector coordination through the creation of task forces.
- Increase service and related activities.
- Reduce poverty and income growth of farmers.

18. The impacts highlighted by the EAPIC likewise included a mix of specific enhancements in SPS management capacity and higher-order impacts:

- Increased surveillance and pest risk assessment.
- Enhanced market access and trade with the USA.
- Increased information sharing among regional NPPOs through databases.

19. Conversely, the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Capacity-Building Needs Assessments for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda focused on lower-level impacts in terms of the enhancement of SPS (specifically food safety) management capacity:<sup>5</sup>

- Provide an appropriate level of protection against food safety risks for domestic consumers.
- Conform to the relevant policy and legal frameworks and ensure the delivery of an efficient food safety control programme.
- Meeting and demonstrating compliance with international food safety and quality requirements and obligations, notably Codex Alimentarius, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and other requirements of trading partners.

20. The intended impacts of the Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety, Global Salm-Surv (GSS) training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa and UNCTAD Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea tend to be more narrowly focused or are less explicit. For example, the declared intention of the GSS network is "to strengthen and enhance the capacities of national and regional laboratories in the surveillance of *Salmonella*, the other major food-borne pathogens and the antimicrobial resistance in *Salmonella* and *Campylobacter* from humans, food and animals through the programme activities."<sup>6</sup>

### **Problems encountered**

21. Although the data collection and analysis presented below largely proceeded with relative ease, certain problems were encountered that served to impede the analysis, as well as to limit the wider validity of the findings. The most notable problems were as follows:

- The information set available for each of the six case study projects differed significantly, both in terms of the amount and type of information available. This made valid comparison across the six projects problematic; thus, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which differing experiences across the projects simply reflects the fact that more/less information was available.
- While personnel in the donors and/or implementers were generally helpful, in some cases their ability to provide detailed information on the respective case study project was limited.
- In some cases beneficiaries were reluctant to speak with the researchers about their personal views and experiences, even though they were offered anonymity if they so desired. While this may reflect the fact that many of the target interviewees had busy schedules, it was also apparent that there was a certain sensitivity on the part of some respondents, either because they did not consider themselves to be sufficiently senior or had not been sanctioned to provide comments, or because there was some concern that their responses might jeopardise the scope for future technical cooperation.

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<sup>5</sup> FAO (2006). *Assessment of Capacity Building Needs of the Food Control System United Republic of Tanzania*. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

<sup>6</sup> WHO (2008). Global Salm-Surv key activities. <http://www.who.int/salmsurv/activities/en/index.html>. Accessed 22 August 2008.

- The scope and structure of the six case study projects was quite narrow and excluded a number of key areas of SPS-related technical cooperation. This restricts the wider validity of the findings and the results should be interpreted with this in mind.

### **III. PARAMETERS OF GOOD PRACTICE IN THE DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF SPS-RELATED TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

#### **Brief overview of projects surveyed**

22. This section gives a brief overview of each of the six case study projects, while Annex I provides specific details on the activities of the projects in each of the study countries.

#### ***Pesticides Initiative Programme***

23. The PIP project became operational in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 2001, within the context of a programme of technical cooperation across a larger number of ACP countries, with initial funding of €38 million over five years. Additional funding was derived from beneficiaries on a cost-sharing basis. The PIP programme was established by the EU at the request of the ACP countries in response to concerns over the potential negative effects on fresh produce exports of the harmonization of Member State controls on pesticides in food, and in particular the establishment of EU-wide maximum residue levels (MRLs). In particular, there were concerns about impacts on competitiveness of the export sector in ACP countries, concentration of the sector and exclusion of small farmers. Subsequently, the danger of exclusion from EU markets was heightened by the emergence and increasing dominance of business-to-business and collective private standards, most notably EurepGAP/GlobalGAP.

24. The objectives set for the PIP were as follows:

- To provide current information on the European market quality requirements through a centralised system via the internet and other sources.
- To help ACP countries create regulations that foster and sustain good agricultural practices particularly on minor tropical crops.
- To promote good company practices through assisting ACP enterprises to adjust, upgrade and certify their practices.
- To help the reorganization of the fresh produce sector and capacity building of different actors in ACP export sectors.

25. The first three objectives were to be achieved through the provision of information, training of producers and guidance in audit and certification processes and other activities driven by the specific needs of the beneficiaries. The fourth objective was to be achieved through the establishment of national task forces that work with small-farmers and exporters, training of local service providers and staff in laboratories and research institutes, enhancement of national control capacity related to trade in fresh produce, etc.

26. On a more general level, the PIP programme aimed to contribute to the development of sustainable trade between ACP countries and the EU. It was, therefore, in line with the three core guiding principles of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement, namely to support the development of the private sector in ACP countries, alleviate poverty and promote regional integration.

### ***East Africa Phytosanitary Information Committee***

27. The original idea for the EAPIC came out of a meeting of East African NPPOs on pest risk assessment in April 2006. It was recognized that the capacity of countries in the East Africa region to meet their mandate, under the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), to provide information on plant pests and diseases of significance to international trade was constrained by poor infrastructure and weak capacity to collect and manage phytosanitary information. To address this constraint the EAPIC was established with financial (US\$130,000) and technical support from USAID, the latter with the substantive involvement of the United States Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). At the current time membership of the EAPIC consists of the NPPOs in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, as well as the African Union (AU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

28. The EAPIC project is developing pest reporting methods and protocols in a systematic manner and establishing an internet-based regional plant pest database that will facilitate data sharing among member countries. The intention is that this data will enable NPPOs in the region to prioritise plant pest and disease controls in the context of prevailing resource constraints including surveillance, detection, diagnosis, inspection and reporting. In turn, the work of the Committee aims to support the establishment of sanitary and phytosanitary requirements across East Africa that are compliant with IPPC protocols and facilitate regional and international trade in plant products. More broadly, the project is seen as presenting a framework that underpins regionally-based SPS controls as a whole, including the harmonization of border inspection protocols.<sup>7</sup>

### ***Capacity-Building Needs Assessment***

29. This project was implemented by FAO under the FAO/Norway Technical Cooperation Programme, which included food safety as one area of activity. Part of the impetus for this work came from the FAO/WHO Regional Conference on Food Safety for Africa in 2005 which recommended that FAO should "lead a diagnostic study of the regional food safety situation in order to determine the most urgent regional needs and priority areas for improvement".<sup>8</sup> The tools developed by FAO to assist national food control agencies to assess their capacity needs were applied in this regard<sup>9</sup>.

30. The Capacity-Building Need Assessments were undertaken by FAO in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, using the same international consultant across the three countries paired with a local consultant in each. These assessments followed the procedures of the rapid assessment tool described above. Indeed, they served the dual function of testing the toolkit and providing rapid assessments of the current status of food control capacity in each of the three study countries. The assessments included development of national action plans towards the enhancement of food control capacity, which were discussed and accepted by the respective governments at national stakeholder consultative meetings in January 2007. The assessments were subsequently compiled into FAO reports, two of which are available widely through the FAO website.

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<sup>7</sup> Suiter, K., Garcia, L. and Stinner, R. (2008). *Building Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS) capacity in East Africa*. PowerPoint presentation.

<sup>8</sup> FAO/WHO (2005). *Final Report. Regional Conference on Food Safety for Africa, Harare, 3–6 October 2005*. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

<sup>9</sup> FAO (2007) *Strengthening national food control systems: A quick guide to assess capacity building needs* and FAO (2007) *Strengthening national food control systems: Guidelines to assess capacity building needs*.

***Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety***

31. This is an annual training programme provided by SWEDAC that forms part of SIDA's wider International Training Programmes (ITPs). The broad aim of the ITPs is to "contribute to capacity development and processes of change in partner countries and other developing countries by offering key persons training programmes in subject areas given priority in Swedish development cooperation, in which Swedish expertise is in demand, and in which use is made of experience from countries at different stages of development."<sup>10</sup>

32. Each ITP course focuses on a range of issues of interest to a number of developing countries, for example SPS and TBT measures, trade negotiations, etc. In previous years, SWEDAC has helped in developing notification procedures and implementing new testing methods and quality systems, on the basis of needs assessments in recipient countries. Each programme has participants from many countries; from a particular region or globally. Participation by individuals from over 60 countries is not unknown. Recognizing that they may have their own learning needs and objectives, which may not exactly fit into the defined aims and subject matter of the course being offered, each participant is required to do a six month project upon returning to their country. The subject matter of this project can be of a participant's own choosing, but should enhance their own skills development and contribute to the development of their institution and country. Thus, the training programme is supposed to act as a catalyst and tool that supports the development of the participant's project rather than being the end product, in and of itself.

33. The course on which the case study focuses was undertaken over the period 21 January 2007 to 16 February 2007 with the theme *Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety*, and a follow-up session in September 2007. The budget was US\$740,000. The programme covered issues such as principles for the development of national food safety laws and policies, SPS issues and the trading system, international standards, food control systems, mechanisms and laws in the EU, HACCP, risk analysis and risk assessment, accreditation processes and laboratory testing. Participants were exposed to examples of good practice in this area through visits to food companies, public food safety control facilities, etc.

***Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa***

34. This project was initiated by the WHO as a result of a broad assessment of needs showing that many developing countries lack the basic infrastructure required to undertake laboratory-based salmonella surveillance. In turn, reflecting the public health importance of food-borne diseases and the need for improved laboratory-based surveillance and associated testing capacity, the WHO formed the GSS in January 2000.

35. Global Salm-Surv is a global network of laboratories and individuals involved in the surveillance, isolation, identification and antimicrobial resistance testing of *Salmonella*. It forms part of WHO's endeavours to strengthen the capacities of its Member States in the surveillance and control of major food-borne diseases and to contribute to the global effort towards the containment of antimicrobial resistance in food-borne pathogens. The programme is targeted at microbiologists and epidemiologists who work in public health, veterinary services, food-related services and environmental health. While GSS is currently focused on *Salmonella*, efforts are being made to extend it to other food-borne pathogens. Indeed, the isolation of *Campylobacter* and *E Coli 0157* are included in the training programme offered.

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<sup>10</sup> SIDA (2008). Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety and Quality, [http://www.sida.se/?d=160&language=en\\_US](http://www.sida.se/?d=160&language=en_US). Accessed 27 August 2008.

36. The GSS offers a multi-level training programme as part of its activities. The focus here is on the basic (or Level I) course offered in Kenya over the period 29 October 2007 to 2 November 2007, which cost around US\$100,000. This course focused on non-typhoid *Salmonella* and *Vibrio Cholerae* as priority pathogens in the target countries. The previously designed curriculum, directed at Francophone African countries, was adapted for the English speaking African context by a WHO expert based in Africa. The course included theoretical aspects of surveillance and laboratory testing and practical laboratory work, as well as practical case studies.

#### ***Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea***

37. This study was undertaken at a cost of US\$18,000 in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea to identify and quantify the costs of compliance with SPS standards faced by exports of tropical products. The study was initiated in 2004 and completed in 2006, following an UNCTAD expert meeting on market access at which Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea requested standards-related assistance. In Tanzania, the World Bank took charge of the study with the intention that estimates of costs of compliance would be derived and actions recommended to build capacity, particularly for EurepGAP/GlobalGAP compliance in production and distribution systems in Tanzania. The study, which involved producers, exporters, business bodies, enterprises and institutions, identified both macro and micro costs of compliance. Macro costs included public and semi-public expenditures (for example training, infrastructure and equipment upgrading, inspection, testing, etc), while micro costs included set up and recurrent costs borne by companies (for example purchase of equipment, training, implementation of management systems, etc). The study also developed a comprehensive set of tools which can be used by the private and public sectors to test and improve food safety control systems. A national workshop was held in Tanzania based on the findings from the three countries.

#### **Good practice in project design**

##### ***Pesticides Initiative Programme***

38. Across beneficiaries in the private and public sectors there was almost universal support for the design of the PIP project. Although none of the in-country beneficiaries we spoke to had been involved in the initiation or design of the project, partly reflecting the fact that PIP is a multi-country project that extends well beyond East Africa, and it was certainly seen as being top down in its promulgation, the goals of the project were seen as appropriate and timely given the challenges the fresh produce sectors in the three countries were facing. Beneficiaries were not aware of how these goals had been defined and whether any form of a needs assessment had been undertaken in support of the project's design, although it was generally considered that any substantive assessment at the country level was unlikely given the wide geographical scope of the PIP.

39. It was apparent that there was wide-scale support for PIP at the political level and within the fresh produce sector in all three countries. This reflects the fact that the project was seen as addressing a real problem - the potential threat to exports of fresh produce to the EU. However, there were some indications that, while the PIP is regarded favourably today, this was not necessarily the case when it was originally implemented. It should be recalled that the PIP started in 2001 and so this current assessment can only present the current picture and an *ex post* reconstruction of views on the project in the past. Indeed, some respondents suggested that they had initially been sceptical of the project, and that the PIP itself had played a major role in making them recognize the potential problems they faced with the evolution of pesticide residue limits and other food safety requirements in the EU. This raises an interesting conundrum; how can potential beneficiaries be involved in the design of a project like the PIP when they are not aware and/or lack understanding of the SPS challenges that they face?

40. Awareness of the scope of the PIP differed significantly between beneficiaries. Broadly, larger firms and public officials had a better understanding of the multiple components of the project

and the manner in which they inter-related and jointly addressed the challenges associated with management of pesticide residues and other food safety issues in the fresh produce sector. These beneficiaries generally considered themselves to be actively engaged with the PIP at a managerial level and thus considered that they had some influence on how the project evolved over time. Smaller firms, conversely, saw themselves as having a more passive and traditional donor-beneficiary relationship and were really only aware of the assistance that the PIP offered to their business.

41. While it was recognized that the activities of the PIP were constrained by the project's design and what was acceptable to the project's funder – the European Commission – it was recognized that the PIP was considerably more flexible than other projects to which respondents had been exposed; broadly speaking, respondents had experience of multiple projects (especially those in Kenya) in the area of food safety capacity-building to which they could compare. Thus, it was seen that the PIP was able to adapt to changing circumstances - the emergence of private food safety standards such as EurepGAP/GlobalGAP was referred to on multiple occasions in this context – and also to the particular needs and circumstances of each country and firms therein. Comparison was made to other projects which tended to present a standard blueprint to which beneficiaries were supposed to adjust, rather than the project adjusting to the needs of beneficiaries. In this way, the notion that the PIP was demand-driven seemed to have come through at the level of beneficiaries.

42. One of the recurring themes in discussion with beneficiaries was the level of engagement of the PIP with the private sector directly; this was considered a positive attribute of the project among respondents in both the private and public sectors. Thus, beneficiaries in the private sector pointed to the fact that they had been excluded from past projects because they were from the private sector and/or they were included as token private sector representatives. Conversely, it was recognized that direct private sector engagement was a key element of the design of the PIP, which enabled the project to assess the needs of firms in a reliable manner (as opposed to through the indirect conduit of the public sector) and to channel assistance directly to individual businesses. Certainly when PIP started, this approach was extremely rare, although more recently the level of direct engagement of donors with the private sector was seen as having become more of the norm; some respondents suggested that the PIP had been instrumental in bringing about this shift in the ways in which capacity-building interventions interacted with exporters.

43. While the PIP was recognized to have been one of the first projects aimed at enhancing the food safety capacity of the public and private sectors, most notably controls on pesticide residues in fresh produce, and instrumental in bringing attention to the rise of private food safety standards, this area was now seen as crowded. Thus, many of the beneficiaries we spoke to were engaged with a number of projects in the broad area of GAP, controls on the use of pesticides and compliance with EurepGAP/GlobalGAP. It was not obvious to these beneficiaries that there was a significant level of coordination across the projects in which they were engaged; indeed instances of overlap and even competition between projects were highlighted.

44. A further positive attribute of the PIP was its long duration compared to the other projects studied. The fact that the project had secured funding and a defined schedule of activities for five years – in stark contrast to certain other interventions that beneficiaries had been engaged with that had only lasted a matter of months – was seen as presenting real opportunities for capacity enhancement. Beneficiaries pointed to the normal routine of project support that meant little could be achieved once baseline assessments and evaluations of needs had exhausted much of the life of the project. The PIP was seen as a refreshing break from this norm. At the same time, some beneficiaries had only begun receiving support from PIP relatively recently and now saw themselves as being cut off when they had only just begun to build their capacity. To these beneficiaries, the fact that the PIP had been operating for three or four years previously had little consequence.

### ***East African Phytosanitary Information Committee***

45. The EAPIC represents a more traditional project in the area of SPS-related technical cooperation when contrasted to the PIP, but was widely seen by beneficiaries as representing a positive example of donor support to the development of phytosanitary capacity. The focus of the project is on the development of official control capacity, such that its engagement is naturally with the public sector. The EAPIC receives both financial and technical support from USAID. Thus, there is an APHIS official based in Kenya that supports the work of the project on an ongoing basis.

46. A number of the beneficiaries we spoke to considered that they had had a role in the original genesis of the EAPIC, the idea for which had emerged at a meeting of East African NPPOs in April 2006. Indeed, the EAPIC was not considered a project *per se*, but rather USAID was seen as supporting the development of a new institutional structure that belonged to the NPPOs in the region. The establishment of the EAPIC also had broad political support in each of the study countries. Evaluations of phytosanitary capacity (some using the IPPC's standard assessment tool) had highlighted fundamental weaknesses in controls on plant pests and diseases while there was recognition that the enhancement of phytosanitary capacity was critical to the facilitation of trade with the USA under the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) as well as the maintenance of established markets in the EU.

47. Beneficiaries highlighted the fact that the EAPIC had been able to adapt and change as priorities were identified, needs changed and capacity developed. This reiterates the fact that the EAPIC is seen as an evolving institution, while funding from USAID has not acted to constrain the activities that can be undertaken. Thus, while the initial idea was to developing lists of pests of trade importance for the region, its focus has now shifted to harmonization with IPPC norms. At the same time, priorities have been set and care taken so that the EAPIC does not "get ahead of itself". In this effort, five crops of significance to regional trade and food security have been prioritised.

48. While the EAPIC is implemented across five countries, it is coordinated in a way that promotes the autonomy of NPPOs, encouraging local ownership and dedication. Each NPPO prioritises its specific lists on the basis of national needs, but there is a mutual benefit for the region as a whole because of data sharing through a flexible database management system that is internet based. For example, the project has completed pest risk assessments for garden peas, baby carrots and baby corn in Kenya that have been accepted by APHIS in the United States.<sup>11</sup>

49. While it was recognized by beneficiaries that they had received support towards the enhancement of phytosanitary capacity on previous occasions, the EAPIC was clearly seen as different. The fact that USAID was providing substantive financial support was obviously a factor here. The contrast was made with previous assessments of capacity by donors that had identified weaknesses in capacity but had not provided any support to help address those weaknesses; respondents remarked that they knew what they had to do to enhance their capacity but did not have the means to do it. At the same time, respondents felt more empowered and in control of the EAPIC, and as a consequence were both able and willing to engage with USAID and their partner NPPOs rather than being passive recipients of assistance.

### ***Capacity-Building Needs Assessment***

50. Broadly speaking, the programme of needs assessments on food control capacity undertaken by FAO in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were seen as top down exercises over which beneficiaries had little influence. Although, the recipient governments had all recognized the need to identify priorities for food safety capacity enhancement and to define national action plans - and indeed both

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<sup>11</sup> Suiter, K., Garcia, L. and Steiner, R. (2008). *Building Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS) Capacity in East Africa*. PowerPoint presentation.

Tanzania and Uganda had previously made official requests towards this end - the assessments were not seen as being owned by the governments. Rather, participation in the project was seen as necessary to attract future donor support towards the enhancement of food safety control capacity, while the project was seen as a way of obtaining external support to fund a necessary needs assessment.

51. While the beneficiaries we spoke to did not necessarily see themselves as partners in the needs assessments, which were seen as having been "done by FAO", the exercise itself was seen as valuable for setting a platform for future actions. Further, the fact that the assessments were based on a standard assessment tool developed by FAO and were undertaken by a team consisting of an international consultant paired with a national consultant was seen as giving credibility to the exercise. Interestingly, the involvement of FAO was seen as important in garnering the domestic political support necessary to bring about institutional change and to attract financial resources from domestic and international sources.

### ***Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety***

52. Reflecting the focus and *modus operandi* of the ITP, this course was offered following a process of needs assessment and priority-setting among developing countries that have an active engagement with SIDA. One of the courses offered by the ITP in 2007 was on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety, which was designed and presented by SWEDAC.

53. Although many participants remarked that they had been on countless training courses, many of which were of dubious value, they suggested that the SWEDAC could be presented as an example of good practice. Key in this regard were the following aspects of course design:

- The aims and objectives of the course were clearly articulated and communicated to potential participants well ahead of time.
- The course was scheduled well ahead of time; governments were sent invitations six months before the course was to be held. This meant that official requests could be filed and work schedules managed accordingly.
- The course was well designed and enabled participants to engage with one another and to play an active role in the proceedings.
- Participants did not just leave the training course abruptly, but rather continued through an individual project that also afforded the opportunity to continue engagement with other course participants and instructors.

54. As a result of the above design factors, the beneficiaries interviewed during this research considered that the course attracted the right people, i.e. individuals who could most gain from the programme of training and had the necessary interest, skills and experience to engage with the body of participants. The fact that the course attracted participants from a number of different countries, and from diverse backgrounds and institutional settings, was seen as a major advantage, offering scope for experience-sharing and the development of longer-term working relations.

55. Although beneficiaries did not feel that they had any role in the design of the training course, or in the initial process of needs assessment, they felt it was both appropriate and timely; suggesting that the underlying process of project design had been undertaken effectively. The lack of engagement of beneficiaries in the design process reflects the fact that the course was offered to potential participants in multiple countries, while more senior officials are likely to have participated in the initial priority-setting exercise.

***Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa***

56. The design of this project was generally considered to follow more of the traditional mode of training courses in the area of SPS-related capacity-building. Thus, the need for the course was identified through a generic process of assessment by WHO, on the basis of experiences with prior training in Francophone Africa and a published evaluation of capacity needs.<sup>12</sup> It was subsequently designed by adapting existing training materials that had been used and tested elsewhere, although in consultation with potential beneficiaries. Previously, the course had been successfully completed in 13 Francophone African countries and there were existing plans to replicate it in Portuguese and English-speaking African countries as funds became available. As a consequence, while beneficiaries saw the need for the course and considered the subject matter appropriate and beneficial, they played no role in its design.

57. For participants, the real innovation in the course was the combination of theoretical and practical aspects. While many participants had been on previous training courses that covered some of the same material, they had not necessarily been given the opportunity to apply, or at least think about how the concepts and techniques learned might be applied. Indeed, it is evident that a great deal of care went into the design of the course undertaken over a period of six months, with regular teleconferences among the design team. This would appear to have paid off.

***Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea***

58. There was only limited awareness of the design of the study in Tanzania. The project had been developed by UNCTAD in response to a request for assistance related to SPS capacity-building, although this request was of a generic nature, while the specific design of the study was essentially undertaken by UNCTAD. A secondary objective of the study was to design and test a standard methodology for assessing and estimating costs of compliance. Among those who were aware of the study, it was recognized that a standard methodology had been applied across the three study countries and that this contributed to greater rigour in the estimates that were derived, engendering confidence among policy-makers in their validity. However, little was known about how and why the methods employed had been used. From a design perspective this project would appear to represent a rather traditional study in the area of SPS-related capacity and compliance, the impetus for which came from UNCTAD rather than the beneficiary country.

**Good practice in project implementation**

***Pesticides Initiatives Programme***

59. Overall, the implementation of the PIP was evaluated extremely positively by the beneficiaries we interviewed, with suggestions that it stood out as an example of good practice in donor support for the enhancement of SPS capacity directed at exports of high-value agricultural and food products. Two factors were seen as key here. First, the strong initial project design that was seen as comprehensive in scope and inclusive by stakeholders. Second, the strong management of the project that steered processes of adjustment to priorities and activities as circumstances changed and learning processes proceeded.

60. One of the key positive aspects of the implementation of the PIP recognized by many beneficiaries was efforts to engage with a wide range of stakeholders across both the public and private sectors and at both the individual and collective levels. This reflects the fact that the project was able, while the management team of the PIP were able and willing, to adjust activities according

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<sup>12</sup> Herikstad, H., Motarjemi Y., and Tauxe, R.V. (2002). Salmonella surveillance: a global survey of public health serotyping, *Epidemiology and Infection*. 129, 1–8.

to ongoing learning processes and identified (and revised) priorities. Respondents remarked that many projects are hampered by their initial design, unable to adjust as circumstances change and as capacity among beneficiaries evolves. In extreme cases, efforts to develop capacity may proceed even though the need for this capacity has gone, simply because that was the defined impact of the project. At the same time, it is apparent that certain initial aspects of the design of the PIP were inappropriate and reflected a lack of appreciation of what mechanisms would be most effective at achieving the defined project outcomes; certainly the management of the PIP faced a steep learning curve in the context of a situation that was rapidly evolving when the project was first implemented. The fact that they achieved the necessary adjustments, and were able to continue to adapt to changing circumstances (for example the growing role of private food safety standards) represents a significant strength of the project's implementation.

61. It is interesting to reflect on the demand-driven approach that represents a fundamental principle on which the PIP was designed and implemented. This was lauded by respondents, not only because it enabled the support provided by the programme to be adapted to the needs of particular private sector beneficiaries, but also because those beneficiaries were able to play a role in designing the assistance they received. Respondents lamented that, too often donors came to them and told them what they wanted. At the same time, the fact that beneficiaries had to apply for support and write formal applications meant that there was some upfront cost and effort, that eliminated those who were not serious and/or did not have the basic minimum level of capacity required to make effective support of any assistance given.

62. Paradoxically, however, the fact that the PIP focused on responding to the demands of private firms rather than telling them what they needed, created initial problems with lack of demand.<sup>13</sup> This reflects the fact that, apart from leading exporters (most notably in Kenya), many firms were unaware of the potential challenges they faced due to regulatory changes and the emergence of private standards in the EU. Thus, the PIP, through its awareness-raising activities, in effect had to create demand for its own capacity-building efforts at the firm level. Putting aside the administrative challenges this presented for the management of the PIP, this raises interesting questions about the operability of a demand-driven model of assistance when prevailing awareness is low (as in Uganda, for example). It also presents challenges for the allocation of assistance over time. Should firms be given support on a first-come-first-served basis, tending to favour those firms that are better informed up front, that will tend to be larger and have greater levels of prevailing capacity? Should firms be given one-time financial support? Alternatively, should a portion of funds be reserved for firms that need to first be helped on to the first level of the pyramid in Figure 1, such that they have the awareness and understanding necessary to fuel demand for higher-levels of capacity-building?

63. An underlying criticism of the PIP project, that applies to many examples of SPS-related technical cooperation, especially directed at the private sector, is the cost-sharing component and the fact that significant elements of hard infrastructure are ineligible for support. Thus, some respondents remarked that they "knew what they had to do", largely as a result of the training and information sharing they had received under the PIP, but "did not have the means to do what was needed". Paradoxically, therefore, the PIP was the source of considerable frustration among certain beneficiaries, notably those in smaller firms that faced considerable capital constraints. At the same time, however, many of these firms were not subject to an acute need to upgrade their capacity – most were not facing immediate demands from their customers to comply with private standards such as EurepGAP/GlobalGAP – and so could plan the phasing-in of capacity improvements over a protracted time period that better suited their financial resources.

64. A key activity within PIP's programme of support was the establishment of industry task forces that bring together key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Although these have struggled to get off of the ground in some cases, especially where prevailing levels of capacity were

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<sup>13</sup> PIP (2005). *Mid-Term Review of the Pesticides Initiative Programme*. COLEACP, Brussels.

very weak and/or there is less of a collective interest within the industry, these have been key to establishing some degree of national ownership in the process of capacity-building supported by the PIP. Indeed, it is evident that the degree of within-country leadership has increased appreciably over time, most notably in Kenya. Certainly in the Kenyan context it would appear that the level of awareness and cooperation across the private and public sectors is at a level that much of the capacity developed by the PIP is now sustainable. Indeed, the fact that the task force is now predominantly industry led is seen as a major achievement. This is less evident, however, in Tanzania and Uganda, reflecting the fact that the prevailing level of capacity across the public and private sectors when the PIP started was much lower than in Kenya. Indeed, in Uganda initial attempts to strengthen an existing task force led by the Department of Crop Protection in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries (MAAIF) failed and efforts had to start afresh around the leadership of the Horticulture Promotion Council of Uganda.

65. Over the period the PIP has been implemented, a number of other donors have commenced projects aimed at developing capacity towards compliance with private food safety standards, as well as the implementation of GAP more generally, especially in Kenya. Indeed, a certain degree of competition between donors has emerged to attract beneficiaries that are seen as having the critical levels of existing capacity needed to present an acceptable chance of success. Initially, there was only limited coordination of support across these projects, although this situation has improved more recently. The national task forces have played a role here, while donors have themselves recognized that there is little to be gained from duplication. This is most notable in Kenya where the national task force has become a key entry point for donor interventions in the sector.

66. The PIP made great efforts to establish local capacity and then to engage local consultants to undertake training, needs assessments, etc., rather than continue to bring in expatriate experts. This was lauded by many of the beneficiaries interviewed. Indeed, over time external consultants were only used where there was an evident lack of national capacity and then efforts were made to "close that gap" in the supply of expertise. In this way, the project has served to establish a critical mass of local capacity that will remain once the project concludes. At the same time, the PIP did not impose particular consultants on beneficiaries, but rather presented firms with a list of approved service providers. Indeed, local consultants were often seen as preferential to non-Ugandans and non-Kenyans, having the language and social skills to interact with farmers. While the PIP was instrumental in establishing a critical supply base of consultants, the project has also been the main source of demand, such that many beneficiary firms have never paid the full price for any services they receive. At the same time, PIP had an established day rate for consultants that was well above what might be considered a normal market price, acting to crowd out any non-supported private demand.

67. Looking across the PIP as a whole, many beneficiaries recognized the highly structured nature of the support provided, across both the public and private sectors. The sequential nature with which assistance was provided enabled recipients to track their own progress, often against agreed plans of action, and not get ahead of themselves. For example, firms could not apply for additional support until the existing phase of support had been completed and verified. At the same time, the services of consultants had to be verified by recipient companies before contractors were paid. Beneficiaries remarked that a secondary impact of this system was the establishment of a culture of accountability among recipients of assistance. While there is an inevitable trade-off between accountability and flexibility, and recognising that some respondents considered the thematic and regional budget lines to be inflexible and reimbursement procedures overly long, most beneficiaries interviewed considered the balance between the two to be "about right".

***East African Phytosanitary Information Committee***

68. The EAPIC has been operational for a period of two years and over this time, has evolved from a project focused on the relatively simple task of developing lists of plant pests and diseases of trade significance for four East African countries to a more complex project that aims to harmonize phytosanitary controls with those of the IPPC and to use this as a model for ACP countries as a whole. This reflects the growing confidence of the member NPPOs in the context of financial and technical support from USAID. Indeed, the USDA official posted in the region sees the EAPIC emerging into a broader and longer-term institution beyond the life of USAID financing, and perhaps with alternative or additional donor support.

69. The EAPIC has apparently made great efforts to engender the active participation of member NPPOs and to promote ownership of the project. Thus, key policy and strategic decisions are made by a vote of members. Likewise, each NPPO enters its own plant pest and disease data, which is checked by the software that has been adapted from a package developed by the Centre for Integrated Pest Management (CIPM) in the United States. In this way, ownership of national data is promoted, while validation permits the sharing of these data across members.

70. Inevitably, the EAPIC has run into implementation problems when it has come up against prevailing capacity constraints beyond the scope of the project itself. For example, the project has set up separate servers in project member countries which will be linked by a regional server housed at KEPHIS in Nairobi which has the best infrastructure. However, Uganda has been struggling to host its server. Because of electricity problems, the server has been running intermittently, while the internet service is expensive and unreliable.

71. The project has now developed to a stage where additional partners have offered technical and/or financial support. For example, FAO is to fund a programme manager for two years, who will, among other things, co-ordinate and prioritize training within the EAPIC. FAO is also providing technical support on biosecurity capacity, with finance from Sweden under the Technical Cooperation Programme. The Gates Foundation has also expressed a willingness to provide funding related to their interest in food security. This suggests that the EAPIC has evolved to the stage where it is self-sustaining, both financially and organizationally.

***Capacity-Building Needs Assessment***

72. The project successfully applied and tested FAO's *Strengthening National Food Control Systems: A Quick Guide to Assess Capacity-Building*, and national action plans were developed and approved for each of the three study countries. The use of an international consultant, who spent limited time in each of the study countries but ensured consistency in the implementation of the evaluation framework and asked difficult questions that a local consultant might be reluctant to ask, combined with a local consultant conversant with local conditions and with extensive knowledge and experience of the national context, worked well.

73. While the implementation of the studies was very much directed from outside the study countries, thus not being conducive to local ownership or control, following the completion of the capacity assessments and action plans, a stakeholder consultation was held in each country. The aim of these consultations was to engender local buy-in and support towards the implementation of the defined action plan. While the views of stakeholders were taken into account in finalizing the capacity assessments and action plans, such an approach is not an ideal way of engaging local actors and remains rather top down.

***Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety***

74. The course was implemented over a four week period with a total of 24 participants. Feedback from participants, both through a quantitative instrument elicited by SWEDAC and in interviews, indicated that the training course had been of significant value. In most areas, the subject matter of the courses was judged to have reached the defined objectives to a large extent, although with some small areas of relative weakness (notably accreditation and laboratory testing). This suggests that, despite the length of the course and breadth of subject matter covered, the project was successful in attaining its teaching objectives.

75. The training course was implemented in a manner that facilitated interaction within the body of participants. Beneficiaries were presented with hands-on exercises, while there was constant monitoring and interaction with trainers. Visits were arranged to laboratories and food processing facilities, exposing participants to new technologies and international standards of good practice. This served to place the taught elements of the course into their real life perspective. There is some evidence that beneficiaries have been able to directly apply the skills they have learnt; for example, participants from the Uganda Bureau of Standards (UBS), Tanzania Food Technology Centre (TFTC) and Tanzania's Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFSC) indicated that they have been able to upgrade their own materials used in food industry training.

76. Participants in the course undertook a project over the six months following the conclusion of the formal taught component. This took the form of an action plan for the enhancement of quality infrastructure in each participant's own country. In both Tanzania and Uganda, there is some evidence that the papers produced by participants fed into the definition of national action plans by government. Indeed, the process of defining action plans was already proceeding in these countries, albeit in an *ad hoc* manner.

77. The course included a follow-up session that was held in Nairobi in September 2007. At this session, each country presented their action plans on which they had been working over the previous six months. This provided an opportunity for feedback from the trainers involved in the course and helped to reinforce the network of policy-makers that the initial course had served to establish. The beneficiaries we spoke to suggested that many had maintained contacts with their fellow participants, both from within their own country and wider afield, representing a wider benefit from participation.

78. The training course offered by SWEDAC clearly represents an example of good practice in comparison with the one-way and passive modes of instruction that are typically applied in the area of SPS capacity building. Certainly, the active engagement of students over a protracted period of time and requiring participants to apply the knowledge they have acquired through the definition of a national action plan are innovative and employ higher-levels of learning. While the design of the course is clearly critical here, so was the selection of participants. The majority of participants were not high level officials (that often make up a significant proportion of training course attendees) but individuals involved in the day-to-day management of food safety. Further, in putting forward potential participants, governments were asked to commit that opportunities would be provided for the selected individuals to apply the knowledge and skills they had acquired in the course on an ongoing basis. While it is difficult to enforce this commitment, this requirement at least forced governments to think which of their staff would benefit most from attendance and provide the greatest return to their ministry or department.

79. It should be noted that the training course was implemented at an opportune time in the case of Tanzania and Uganda since both countries were planning to implement a national food safety policy. Thus, in the Tanzanian Ministry of Health, a committee had been tasked with finding areas of regulatory overlap within government in the area of food safety and to define ways in which these might be overcome. In both of these countries, therefore, there was a high level of receptivity to the training being offered. It should be recognized, however, that this situation occurred by action rather

than design, reflecting the fact that the course was offered across a multitude of countries. Although there was no direct evidence of it, the coincidence of the SWEDAC training course and the FAO capacity-building assessments can be assumed to have some degree of synergy.

***Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa***

80. The course was successfully implemented in October/November 2007 at the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), which undertook much of the local organization. The course was attended by 26 participants from 10 countries, including the three case study countries for this research. The curriculum combined teaching sessions and practical classes that permitted participants to obtain hands-on experience with the techniques being presented, presented by a combination of regional and international trainers. On the basis of interviews with attendees at the training course, the course was well received and participants were generally able to apply at least some of the knowledge they had accrued in their day-to-day work; around 50 percent of participants were from public health, 25 percent clinical from microbiology and 25 percent from food and veterinary science. At the same time, some beneficiaries remarked that laboratory facilities in their home institutions were not conducive to the application of the techniques the course had introduced them to.

81. A qualitative evaluation was undertaken of the course, which was generally favourable. However, this mainly focused on administrative and organizational aspects. On the basis of this evaluation there are plans to organize the next stage of the training programme (Level II).

***Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea***

82. The study was successfully concluded in 2005, coordinated by the World Bank and with the substantive work in Tanzania being undertaken by a consultant. The research team was not able to gather any substantive information on the manner in which the study was undertaken, although a review of the study report suggests it employed standard, although rigorous, methods. From our interviews with beneficiaries in Tanzania it was not evident that there was widespread awareness of the study.

**Good practice in projects outputs and impacts**

83. This section aims to provide analysis of the impacts of each of the six case study projects. In so doing, it focuses on the degree to which each project acted to enhance SPS-related management capacity, using the hierarchy of functions presented in Figure 1 as the lens, and impact of higher-level objectives.

***Pesticides Initiatives Programme***

84. The direct focus of the PIP has been on the enhancement of food safety management capacity across the public and private sectors in beneficiary countries towards "the improvement of the food safety of the fruits and vegetables exported to the European markets" which should be "adapted to the international standards and to the growing requirements of the consumers, thanks to the traceability and the food-safety approaches of their associations and professional committees." Of all of the case study projects, the PIP is the most comprehensive and is the only one directed at capacity-building in the public and private sectors. It is also unique in the scope of interventions employed that encompass training, information dissemination, support for the establishment and/or enhancement of regulatory and management systems, technical and financial assistance for certification to private standards, induction of collective action and cooperation within the private sector and between the public and private sectors, etc. As such it presents a number of examples of good practice in terms of impacts.

85. The most immediate and wide-ranging impact of the PIP has been to create awareness in the fresh produce sector in all three of the study countries regarding the importance of food safety to export competitiveness and the need for enhancement of capacity directed at compliance with regulatory requirements and private standards in the EU. While it is probable that such awareness would have eventually emerged in these countries, it is widely recognized that PIP served to disseminate information far more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case, especially within the public sector and among smaller exporters. At the same time, awareness has been fostered along the supply chain, rather than just at the level of exporters, for example to out-growers, and among service providers. In turn, there is now widespread recognition of the importance of co-ordination within the private sector and between the public and private sectors. The task forces promoted and supported by PIP were recognized to have been critical in this regard. Some respondents were of the view that these task forces would have emerged even if PIP had not been in place, although they would have taken much longer to become established and would have probably taken a different direction.

86. PIP not only served to engender initial awareness of the importance of food safety capacity and compliance to the fresh produce sector in the three countries, but disseminated information on emerging issues and changes in regulatory requirements and private standards on an ongoing basis. For example, the PIP published a regular newsletter. It was recognized that the resources to establish a system of information capture, monitoring and dissemination would have been beyond the resources of the three countries, and indeed concerns were expressed among beneficiaries about how they would continue to gain access to timely information once the PIP had come to an end.

87. As well as disseminating technical information, the PIP was active in translating this information into practical guides that could be implemented by exporters and their suppliers more readily. These took the form of production protocols and training charts, as well as video materials. The PIP has also worked with private and public (for example the Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA) in Kenya) partners to develop and implement training programmes, for example directed at smallholders. Respondents considered these materials to have been of immense value, enabling them to understand and implement rather complex systems in their own contexts. This was particularly the case among smaller firms that lacked the resources of the major exporters, most notably in Kenya. Indeed, while the large and well-established exporters undoubtedly benefited from the PIP, arguably the greatest impacts were seen among small and medium-sized firms that generally had lower levels of prevailing capacity and lacked the financial and technical resources to capture information on food safety requirements and standards and to adapt their systems of procurement accordingly.

88. Looking further up the pyramid in Figure 1, the PIP has been instrumental in developing specific elements of hard and soft capacity, in both the public and private sectors. For example:

- In Kenya, the first private certification services provider in the region (AfriCert) has received considerable direct support in the form of training and establishment of auditing and certification systems. Further, to date most of the paid services provided by this company have been funded by the PIP. Across all three countries private providers of training and consultancy, integrated pest management (IPM) and auditing services have all received substantive support from the PIP.
- A number of exporters have been provided with support towards certification to the EurepGAP/GlobalGAP and/or organic standards. This support has taken the form of training, consultancy services for the implementation of internal control systems, full or part funding of initial auditing and certification costs, etc.
- Enhancement of regulatory systems for the approval and control of pesticides and of surveillance and testing regimes directed at controlling pesticide residues in fresh produce for

export. This has included the promulgation of new legal instruments and the reform of regulatory systems. For example, the PIP worked with the Pesticide Control Products Board (PCPB) in Kenya to create an active pesticide database that lists current and approved pesticides.

- Development of industry standards, for example KenyaGAP, that were benchmarked to regulatory and/or private standards in the EU. The process of developing these standards and work towards their implementation was seen as driving improvements in overall levels of food safety management in the fresh produce export sector.
- Implementation of good practices in testing laboratories, training in new analytical methods and maintenance procedures for equipment, etc. This included training programmes, visits to laboratories in the EU, etc. In the case of the KEPHIS laboratory in Kenya, accreditation to ISO17025 has been achieved and efforts are being made for certification to ISO 9001 2000.

89. Many beneficiaries pointed to the fact that these initiatives had been translated into better and more rigorous food safety controls across the private and public sectors, such that exporters (for example) were more confident in the safety of their products and their compliance with EU market requirements. Some respondents suggested that their level of rejections and/or complaints from customers had declined as a result, while they were more confident in themselves that they were applying good practices. At the same time, there was a widespread view that significant gains in export volumes or revenue should not be expected (and indeed had not been experienced); rather, the enhancement of food safety capacity had become necessary to prevent being excluded from EU markets in the future.

90. While the PIP was widely lauded as an effective and timely intervention, almost without exception, some private sector respondents pointed to the fact that they had not been able to implement the changes recommended because of lack of finance. Indeed, some of the beneficiaries interviewed said they were "tired" of being told what they needed to do and instead needed assistance in gaining access to the means to make the necessary investments. Likewise, the scope for the public sector to implement improved laboratory practice was constrained by the inability to make investments in new equipment or shortages of personnel, most notably in Uganda. This highlights the challenging environment that the PIP was working in and the need to be realistic about what can be achieved and to adjust the level and types of support provided accordingly. However, it also highlights the need for technical support programmes such as PIP to be accompanied by efforts on the part of beneficiary governments and firms to make accompanying investments, and perhaps to be co-ordinated with wider financial support projects and programmes.

91. The broader or general aim of the PIP was to "build the long-term competitiveness of private enterprises in the ACP horticultural sector" as part of an "equitable growth for small and medium-sized producers." This suggests that the ultimate focus of PIP is on higher-level objectives, such as export growth and the inclusion of smallholders, rather than SPS capacity-building *per se*. In a development context, this would appear to be appropriate. However, while the project identifies the enhancement of SPS-related capacity as a key driver towards the competitiveness of the horticultural sector in ACP countries, a wide range of other factors over which the project has little or no influence or focus (for example the enhancement of productivity, development of transport infrastructures, etc.) have a key influence making it extremely difficult to separate out or attribute the influence of PIP. This was reflected in the mid-term evaluation of the PIP which deemed that the overall goal of the project was too ambitious and should be reformulated.

92. Recognizing the attribution problems noted above, many beneficiaries were of the view that the PIP had contributed to maintaining and enhancing access to EU markets for fresh produce against the spectre of exclusion associated with the harmonization of MRLs in the EU and the emergence of EurepGAP/GlobalGAP. While this claim is extremely difficult to substantiate – we have no way of

knowing the counterfactual – it is evident that three study countries are in a much better position to address the challenges they face due to ongoing changes in regulatory requirements and private standards. At the same time, many smaller exporters across the three study countries (that mainly supplied traders in EU wholesale markets on a consignment basis) were not yet facing demands for stricter food safety controls from their customers, and indeed had not faced any problems in complying with regulatory requirements (for example on pesticide residues). While we might reasonably expect such firms to be in a better position to meet stricter food safety requirements as and when they are applied in the future, we have no way of knowing when this will occur.

93. The other danger raised by the imposition of stricter food safety requirements and standards in the EU is the exclusion of smallholders from supply chains to exporters. The PIP has put significant levels of support into supporting exporters, including some of the larger and better established firms, in their efforts to adjust their procurement systems in a manner that enables smaller producers to comply. This has included compliance and certification to EurepGAP/GlobalGAP. While some of the beneficiaries we talked to had rationalized their supply base, claiming the costs of implementing and maintaining effective food safety controls over numerous small farmers as the reason, it is difficult to surmise the extent to which the PIP has mitigated this process. At the same time, it is evident that a number of exporters had made substantial inputs of time and money into their smallholder supply base. Many of these exporters suggested that the support they had received from the PIP had been critical in their decision to make such investments.

94. Looking at the concept of competitiveness beyond the issue of food safety, a number of beneficiaries (especially larger firms) suggested that the support they had received from PIP had enabled them to make broader managerial and organizational changes, which had contributed to increased efficiency and reduced costs. For example, exporters had seen the management of their out-grower schemes improved, through changes to their own managerial systems and attitudinal change and better production practices among small producers. This had resulted in improvement in quality, reduced use of pesticides and other inputs, etc. It was suggested that these improvements had not only been to the benefit of the exporter, but also smallholders, who had seen better returns due to lower production costs paired with reduced rejection rates.

95. A critical concern about the PIP is the degree to which the capacity created is sustainable. That is, will this capacity be maintained rather than dwindle in the absence of external technical and/or financial support and can it evolve further as food safety requirements in EU markets change? While only time will tell - the PIP only came to an end in 2008 – there are signs that some elements of capacity have the rigour to be maintained. For example, AfriCert in Kenya is beginning to see a commercial market for its services in Africa and Agribusiness Management Associates (AMA), a consultancy service in Uganda, has developed its own training programmes on the basis of skills obtained through the PIP and recently co-bid with Fintrac on a \$40 million USAID project. At the same time, some concerns were expressed about the degree to which sufficient market demand will exist in the medium term to support the consultancy and analytically services put in place with PIP support. For example, while the KEPHIS laboratory in Kenya now has quite substantial analytical capacity for pesticide residues and is being used routinely by the HCDA, most exporters still send their samples to laboratories overseas, predominantly in Europe. This is not to say that firms in Kenya do not have confidence in KEPHIS, but rather that their customers tend to have more confidence in testing results from laboratories in Europe. In the case of private service providers such as AfriCert and AMA, there are concerns that demand will dwindle without the PIP to provide the impetus and financial support to sue such services; indeed, one or two respondents remarked that firms were not used to paying for such services when a donor had always been there to write the cheque.

96. It was evident that the impact and efficacy of the PIP differed across the study countries, reflecting levels of prevailing capacity, sectoral structure, market requirements and incentives towards enhancement of food safety controls, etc. For example, the PIP was able to make relatively quick

inroads into the horticultural sector in Kenya, where a relatively effective industry organization was already in place (FPEAK) and there were a number of leading exporters that had already made substantive progress towards the implementation of GAP and other food safety management practices. Here the role of PIP was to support these larger firms in their efforts while inducing processes of upgrading of food safety controls among smaller exporters. The fact that FPEAK was already in place enabled PIP to form collaborative relations; for example, a protocol was put in place between the PIP and FPEAK to promote local press coverage on current food safety issues that facilitated wider dissemination among stakeholders and promoted political interest in these issues. Conversely, in Uganda the horticultural export sector was nascent, with no significant exporters and a weak industry organization. In this context, the PIP's focus had to be on strengthening institutional structures.

97. Differences in progress and approaches of the PIP across the study countries are also evident in the case of the development and implementation of private standards benchmarked to EurepGAP/GlobalGAP. The KenyaGAP standard has now been fully developed and efforts are being made towards implementation. Beneficiaries were of the view that this would not have been achieved without the PIP, not only because of the technical support it provided, but because it acted as an independent arbiter that prevented the standards from being captured by dominant interests and bottlenecks due to different parties defending their established positions. At the same time, the success of Kenya in developing KenyaGAP reflects the fact that the industry is well developed and has a middle-ground of firms that may benefit from the promulgation of such a standard. Conversely, while Uganda is also making efforts to develop its own private standard that would ultimately be benchmarked to EurepGAP/GlobalGAP, the continued weakness of the Horticultural Promotion Organization of Uganda (HPOU), lack of a critical mass of industry leaders and absence of any real market drivers towards the implementation of GAP have meant that little progress has been made. While this could be seen as a failing of the PIP, and indeed some respondents saw it as such, it also illustrates the ability and willingness of the management team implementing the PIP to adjust to local conditions in terms of the particular foci of their efforts and allocation of financial and technical resources.

98. Unique to the PIP across all of the case study projects, were the efforts made not only to develop capacity in the beneficiary countries but also to influence the evolution of regulatory policy in the EU. Thus, PIP provided support to KEPHIS to undertake testing of soil, water and produce samples and undertook trials with smallholders to ascertain achievable MRLs. These were communicated to the European Commission and are recognized to have had some influence on the MRLs set for certain crops and active ingredients.

#### ***East African Phytosanitary Information Committee***

99. In contrast to the PIP, the EAPIC project focuses solely on public sector capacity, specifically relating to the control of plant pests and diseases. The project seeks to build institutional capacity across East African to undertake pest risk assessments that will meet the needs of export markets, notably the USA. Thus, while having a higher-level objective of boosting exports as one of its objectives, its primary impact is seen as boosting specific SPS-related capacities towards the top of the pyramid in Figure 1.

100. Towards the goal of enhancing phytosanitary capacity across the region, the project has established separate servers in project countries, which will ultimately be linked to a regional server at KEPHIS in Kenya. In turn, the EAPIC aims to create a platform for NPPOs to carry out systematic pest risk assessments. Prior to the implementation of the project, the pest risk assessments and/or pest lists compiled by NPPOs tended to be *ad hoc* and in most cases not comprehensive. This reflected the weakness of surveillance and/or communication systems. For example, while the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) had been compiling pest lists since 1954, these were out of date and excluded certain categories of pests, for example viruses and nematodes. Through the

information provided across the network of countries, the aim is for NPPOs to compile updated and comprehensive pest lists that can be maintained. In turn, the ability to undertake pest risk assessments will allow scientists to prioritise issues and employ effective systems; they will know which pests to look for and how to do it. This provides a very good example of good practice in regional cooperation.

101. The EAPIC is an ongoing project and, although substantive progress has been made, the ultimate impacts are yet to be realized. The internal EAPIC team is already using preliminary pest lists to check for diseases, enabling faster decisions about imports, exports and quarantine in inter-regional trade, although final lists will not be uploaded to the regional data sharing system until later in 2008. However, the beneficiaries we spoke to noted that significant benefits had been achieved in terms of the functionality of their phytosanitary controls, while participation in the EAPIC had served to highlight the importance of this area of SPS capacity to political decision-makers. Certainly the degree of cooperation across NPPOs in the region has been enhanced significantly; one respondent remarked that in the past "they never really talked to each other" and this has evidently changed.

102. One area where the EAPIC has made substantial progress, and presents an example of good practice, is achieving approval for the exportation of specific products for export to the US. Thus, with the support of APHIS, the Kenyan government prepared and submitted pest risk assessments and obtained approval for importation to the US of shelled garden peas, baby carrots and baby corn in a relatively short period of time. The project anticipates that green beans, snow peas and sugar snap peas will be approved for export to the US in the not too distant future. While illustrating the potential trade benefits of the EAPIC – these have yet to be realized since no exports of the approved commodities have taken place to date – this example also illustrates the capacity of countries in the region to overcome restrictions due to SPS measures if given appropriate assistance.

#### ***Capacity-Building Needs Assessment***

103. While capacity assessments had been successfully completed in all three of the case study countries, there were evident differences in the response of governments and the degree to which this project has induced further action towards the enhancement of food safety functions in Figure 1. We review progress to date in each of the study countries in turn below.

104. In Kenya, progress since the stakeholder meeting that concluded the project has been limited. Due to political instability in December 2007, FAO postponed all elements of its planned activities involving political structures or decisions. Thus, the national action plan and proposed legislative changes were put on hold and a decision was made to focus on Tanzania in the immediate future. However, items in the action plan have been prioritized and it is anticipated that efforts will soon commence towards their implementation. Indeed, FAO has continued to provide technical assistance to the National Food Safety Committee (NFSC) towards developing a national food safety policy document and respondents were of the view that initiatives would soon be taken towards enhancement of food safety capacity in the country.

105. In Tanzania, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) and FAO organized a national symposium for policy decision-makers on 28 June 2008 that aimed to raise awareness of food safety and quality issues. Subsequently, a two-year action plan to follow-up on the recommendations of the original project report has been formulated with the support of FAO and that also envisages cooperation with WHO, UNIDO and UNDP in the area of food safety and quality. This work will involve the strengthening of food inspection systems, training on Codex Alimentarius guidelines for food quality and safety, development of public awareness and communications material for the informal food sector, small and medium firms in the formal sector and consumers and specific needs assessments for stakeholders identified in the action plan. We are yet to see the extent to which these identified priorities move forward and are reflected in real gains in capacity, although it is evident that

there is considerable political impetus behind the action plans and beneficiaries we spoke to anticipated real progress in the medium term.

106. A key finding of the capacity assessment in Tanzania was the lack of accreditation of Tanzanian laboratories which, it was deemed, seriously undermined the country's food control system with regard to international SPS commitments. It recommended speeding up of existing accreditation initiatives and extension of accreditation efforts to other laboratories, especially the chemistry laboratories at the TBS. Prior to the project, the TBS had formulated plans towards the enhancement of laboratory capacity with funding from DANIDA for staff training and the upgrading of 17 laboratories across the country. Understandably, the FAO assessment repeated these same needs within their assessments.

107. In the case of Tanzania there is some evidence that the capacity assessment undertaken by FAO has had a tangible impact on government policy. In May 2008 the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) was restructured as recommended by the national report resulting from the capacity assessment. At the same time, however, it is not clear that a coherent single policy has been devised and is being implemented at the current time. This suggests rather mixed evidence on impacts at the current time.

108. In Uganda, the country action plan was revised by stakeholders, notably relevant government agencies and adopted as the National Strategic Plan to Improve Food Safety and Quality in Uganda. After the high-level stakeholders consultative meeting in February 2007, government agencies agreed to prioritise their activities according to this adopted plan. The action plan was intended to lead to the development of a strategic food safety action plan, although this has not proceeded as intended. While the Uganda National Bureau of standards (UNBS) and Ministry of Health were receiving support from UNIDO, with funding by Norway, that could support a number of the identified priorities, poor communications and lack of resources locally were hampering progress. Again this suggested a significant degree of overlap between the capacity assessment and ongoing technical cooperation efforts in the area of food safety, and also the lack of coordination of these efforts.

109. While the capacity assessments undertaken by FAO were designed to identify capacity weaknesses and guide the formulation of action plans rather than having a direct impact on capacity *per se*, experiences across the three countries highlight some key issues for good practice. Fundamental here is the importance of political buy-in at a high level, reflecting the need for significant investments of local resources towards capacity enhancement and the fact that responsibility for food safety controls typically cuts across multiple ministries and departments and/or can require the reallocation of responsibilities and resources. At the same time it is critical that assessments of this kind are coordinated with existing technical cooperation, which presumably completed their own capacity assessments.

#### ***Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety***

110. The four week programme of training provided by this project aimed to expose practitioners from developing countries to international standards on good practice, train them in the systematic development of food safety policies and allow these practitioners to go back to guide the development of food quality and safety systems and policies, and to promote these policies, among relevant stakeholders in their countries. Thus, the project was directly aimed at supporting the enhancement of food safety capacity, with a focus on most levels in Figure 1, while not in and of itself bringing about such capacity enhancements; presumably actions by national governments with or without donor support would be instrumental in this regard.

111. Upon completion of the training course participants returned to their countries and worked for six months on a draft policy document which they later presented at workshop in Nairobi in September 2007. The progress and status of this draft policy varied across the study countries.

112. The Ugandan team submitted a draft food safety policy to the National Codex Committee (NCC). This was very well received although action to be taken had to be directed through the Ministry of Health as the lead authority on food safety and health policy. Subsequently, together with the chairman of the NCC, the Ugandan team formed a working group. This working group produced a draft document that was presented to the Ministry of Health in September 2007. Currently, Uganda is drafting a new food law and members of the team interviewed during this research felt that they had provided a useful input to this process, which is ongoing.

113. In Tanzania, the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA) is leading the development of a national food safety policy. After the SWEDAC training programme, the Tanzanian team presented their draft report, as a result of which the team was reformulated to include more senior representatives of the Ministry of Health, TFDA and Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC). The draft report was subsequently revised, resulting in a draft National Food Safety Policy in December 2007. The team is currently working on a Swahili version of the draft policy, the final version of which will be translated into English. Our understanding is that the Ministry of Health has informed parliament that it will have a national food safety policy in place within a year or two. Alongside these developments, through the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, the team routinely communicates on food quality issues to consumers, producers, retailers, etc.

114. The SWEDAC training course provides an excellent example of good practice in the provision of training towards SPS capacity enhancement. Notably, it demonstrates how linking condensed periods of training to practical applications on the part of trainees can both enhance the degree of skills development and enable beneficiaries to have real impacts in their home country. Thus, in the case of both Uganda and Tanzania we see that attendees have been able to engage with their governments and have a tangible impact on the evolution of policy. At the same time this case illustrates the need for training programmes of this type to be attuned to policy development priorities and processes in the home countries of attendees; the fact that participants in the SWEDAC training programme have been able to have such a significant impact in their home country reflects the fact that both Uganda and Tanzania are in the process of defining a national food safety policy/strategy.

***Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa***

115. The target impact of this training course was the enhancement of a specific element of food safety capacity towards the centre of the pyramid in Figure 1. While many participants in the course were constrained in their ability to apply the skills imparted by this programme - laboratory-based analysis and surveillance of *Salmonella* – most participants interviewed were of the view that their skills and expertise had been enhanced appreciably. Perhaps of greater significance, however, was the informal network of researchers that was created among participants in the course. A number of participants noted that they had shared information and even data with other laboratories, for example on antimicrobial resistance, that were members of this network. Further, they indicated that because they had met their counterparts face-to-face and spent a protracted period of time getting to know them they were willing to engage in remote dialogue and information sharing of this type. This would not have happened if they had not attended the course. While it was recognized that a more formal network was needed across countries, this informal collaboration was regarded as "better than nothing".

116. In terms of enhancement of food safety capacity, to date it is not possible to ascertain whether this project has induced substantive increases in capacity, beyond soft skills towards the base of Figure 1. At the same time, it does present an example of good practice in more technical training – extended periods of training combining technical and practical aspects – that appears to have been effective in imparting new skills and creating interactions between participants that are maintained once the course has been concluded.

*Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea*

117. This project produced a quite rigorous study of the costs of compliance with export market food safety requirements for tropical projects in Tanzania. It is not apparent, however, whether this study has had any appreciable impacts domestically in Tanzania.

118. The discussion of project impacts above focuses on each of the study projects on a case-by-case basis. In so doing, the cumulative impact of these projects was not considered. Presumably, advancements in SPS capacity in all three of the study countries, which we can certainly observe, reflect (at least in part) the significant levels of technical cooperation over recent years, including but not restricted to the six case study projects. For example, we might reasonably expect the Capacity-Building Needs Assessment undertaken by FAO and Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea undertaken by UNCTAD, and indirectly the Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety undertaken by SWEDAC, to have informed capacity-building processes in the case study countries. Assessing and attributing ongoing processes of capacity are beyond the scope of this study, but should certainly be the focus of future research work.

#### **IV. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED**

119. The six project case studies outlined above, do present examples of good practice across a range of forms of technical cooperation. Below we outline some of the main themes that have emerged and also raise some questions about the design of projects in varying contexts.

*Demand-versus supply-driven technical cooperation*

120. It is now generally recognized that technical cooperation should ideally be demand-driven, in contrast to the predominance of supply-driven approaches in the past. Thus, the design and implementation of projects should engage potential beneficiaries in processes of needs assessment, acting to design cooperation around prevailing local capacity, instill local ownership in capacity-building efforts and building capacity in needs identification, appraisal and priority-setting. We see evidence of this in a number of the case study projects. For example, PIP required that private sector beneficiaries applied for support and that a needs assessment was undertaken, although this assessment normally involved an external consultant. In this way assistance was tailored to each individual beneficiary to the extent permitted by the boundaries of the project as a whole. While being demand-driven, in that a priority-setting exercise was undertaken to define the specific area in which SIDA's International Training Programme focused, the Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety was not tailored to the specific needs of each beneficiary country, but rather targeted developing countries as a whole. In other cases, for example the EAPIC, countries in the region as a collective identified the need for a particular capacity-building effort, in collaboration with the donor.

121. It is apparent, however, that demand-driven modes of technical cooperation are not always appropriate. Indeed, we would suggest that assistance might be more meaningfully supply-driven in certain contexts, for example where:

- Prevailing levels of SPS-related capacity are weak in the public and/or private sectors, such that there may be lack of awareness of the need for and/or nature of specific elements of capacity.
- SPS requirements in export markets are changing rapidly. This is particularly the case where capacity to capture information on evolving SPS requirements is weak and/or not explicitly linked to decision-making processes.

- Acute risks/emergencies arise that require rapid action, especially where these risks are new and local capacity to address them is weak.

122. Thus, the Global Salm-Surv training programme followed a more traditional supply-driven approach, with the WHO being the predominant driver behind the decision to mount the course and in adapting it to local circumstances. Given the specific expertise involved and the efforts of the WHO to promote capacity in the area of laboratory surveillance of food-borne pathogens, this would appear to be appropriate; given that capacity in many of the beneficiary countries was weak, how could they be expected to identify specific needs for capacity-building? Likewise, in its initial phase the PIP engaged in an extensive process of awareness-raising about changes in EU regulatory controls for pesticides residues in fresh produce and later on the emergence of private food safety standards; previous to these efforts there was little recognition of these changes except among leading exporters. In this way the PIP created demand for capacity-building, but then engaged beneficiaries in the design of the specific assistance they received.

### *Needs assessment*

123. In many technical cooperation projects some form of needs assessment is undertaken, whether involving the beneficiary, donor, or both. Too often the form taken by this assessment is not clear and quite different approaches are employed across projects, creating inconsistencies, increasing the transaction costs for beneficiaries and impeding the employment of good practice. The effort by FAO to design and validate a rapid assessment tool for food control capacity, which was piloted through the Capacity-Building Needs Assessment project described above, is a welcome initiative. Indeed, there are now structured frameworks for assessing capacity relating to plant health (by the IPPC Secretariat), animal health (by the OIE) and food safety (by FAO) which enable needs to be assessed *within* each these areas in a consistent manner. The progressive use of these frameworks across donors would enable developing country beneficiaries to develop skills and experience that empower them in needs assessment processes.

### *Flexibility*

124. Inevitably, technical cooperation efforts are bounded by the constraints imparted by project design and the policies and procedures of donors. Critical to the efficacy of capacity-building efforts, however, is room for interventions to be flexible in their scope and modes of delivery. Thus, circumstances may change and priorities shift over time, while needs and capacities may differ across multiple recipients of assistance. The PIP provides a particularly good example of the need for flexibility and the resulting benefits in terms of project impacts. Thus:

- The level and forms of assistance was adapted across countries. Hence, the way in which the PIP engaged with FPEAK in Kenya was quite different to the support they provided to the horticultural sector task force in Uganda, reflecting the level of prevailing capacity and challenges.
- The assistance provided to individual exporters was tailored to their prevailing capacity, commercial position and needs.
- The project was able to accommodate the growing importance of private food safety standards, in particular EurepGAP/GlobalGAP and divert resources to support beneficiaries in achieving certification to such standards.

125. Flexibility was also observed in the EAPIC, which started as a relatively simple attempt to develop pest lists for the East Africa region, but evolved into a more ambitious effort to enhance capacity to undertake pest risk assessments, share data across countries, etc. Much of this change was

driven by beneficiaries of the project, with the ability of the project to evolve acting to engender a sense of local ownership.

126. The need for flexibility also applies to the definition and assessment of intended impacts. Thus, what can reasonably be achieved in the context of relatively strong prevailing capacity, across the public and/or private sectors, is quite different to the challenges faced in building capacity in the context of a nascent industry or SPS management system. Technical cooperation projects need to be able to account for such differences, especially where a project is applied across countries and/or sectors so as not to enforce a one size fits all model and/or to judge the impacts of an intervention using the same measures in differing contexts.

### ***Practitioner networks***

127. A number of the projects reviewed above have created practitioner networks among beneficiaries, whether as an intended impact or as a secondary consequence. In all cases, these have emerged as valuable outputs that empower beneficiaries and engender local ownership and provide an ongoing mechanism for capacity enhancement. In the case of the EAPIC, the establishment of a network of NPPOs was the explicit aim of the intervention. This project has been extremely successful in establishing a viable community of practitioners and institutions engaged in the management of plant pests and diseases. Key here has been engendering a high degree of local ownership and control. In the case of the Global Salm-Surv training programme and the Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety less formal networks of beneficiaries have been established, but which have emerged as potential long-term mechanisms for the sharing of knowledge and experiences. Key here was the fact that both training programmes were held over extended periods of time, while most participants were away from their normal place of work and were able to engage with fellow participants in both work and leisure time.

### ***Active learning***

128. A welcome trend in technical cooperation projects that impart knowledge and skills through training is the use of more active modes of learning. These can include the engagement of students in dialogue among themselves and/or with instructors, problem-based learning, project work, etc. These methods are in stark contrast to the traditional student-instructor relationship that has pervaded training programmes to date. The Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety project provides a particularly good example of these practices. Thus, students were actively encouraged to engage with one another and their instructors and to apply the knowledge they gained through the course to an extended project on which they received feedback. As with this project, more active modes of learning frequently require that training programmes are extended - in this case the programme lasted four weeks and participants we spoke to were of the view it could even have been extended to five weeks – which necessitates that resources are focused on training fewer beneficiaries better. The Global Salm-Surv training programme also provides an example of good practice in this regard, combining formal instruction in laboratory techniques with practical sessions in the laboratory.

129. Beyond the development of soft capacity through training programmes, the active engagement of beneficiaries in capacity-building is critical to effective cooperation and sustainability. The PIP has been particularly effective in this regard, for example through the use of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with beneficiaries linked to agreed action plans. Thus, individual beneficiaries are able to track their own progress, while taking responsibility for ensuring capacity is developed as agreed. Because capacity is developed on a cost-sharing basis, beneficiaries have a stake in their own development and an incentive to ensure that funds are spent well, including that private service producers perform as expected. This acts to enhance the efficacy of capacity-building efforts and also to promote value for money on the part of investments by the PIP. While these arrangements may act to deter weaker and/or more risk averse firms from participating in the PIP, we

might question the sustainability of capacity within such firms; perhaps it is appropriate that they are excluded from capacity-building arrangements of this type.

### ***Linking skills development to practice***

130. It is evident that training programmes work most effectively when linked to the specific needs and day-to-day duties of beneficiaries. While it is very difficult to customise training to the needs of individuals, linkages with practice can be achieved through project work and other practical exercises. The Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety provides an excellent example of good practice in this regard. Here participants undertook a six month project involving the drafting of a national action plan in the area of food safety. Through working as a group and engaging decision-makers in their government, it is evident that participants in this project were able to apply the knowledge they had acquired to valuable effect, not only enhancing their own learning experience but producing an output that was of wider value and contributed to ongoing processes of capacity-building in the area of food safety.

### ***Selection of beneficiaries***

131. The efficacy of training programmes at enhancing capacity reflects not only the content and mode of delivery but also the choice of participants. This also applies to more comprehensive support programmes such as the PIP. This is a sensitive issue because it implies that certain beneficiaries – countries, firms, producers or individuals – are excluded. Making the intended impacts of technical cooperation clear and explicit upfront is critical here; if for no other reason to legitimise participation decisions. At the same time it is important to recognize what prevailing capacities are necessary for effective engagement with potential beneficiaries. There is no point in developing capacity higher up in the hierarchy in Figure 1 if lower levels of capacity are missing.

132. In the case of training programmes, substantive and sustainable capacity will only be generated if the individuals chosen to receive training have the necessary skills and experience and the opportunity to apply the knowledge and skills they acquire in their day-to-day work. The Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety and Global Salm-Surv training programmes providing examples of good practice in this regard. Thus, both of these projects were focused at participants from a range of backgrounds - bringing differing experiences and needs into the learning environment – and involved individuals at a practical rather than senior management level that were engaged on a day-to-day basis with managing food safety. Too often, training programmes have been directed at, or have attracted, the participation of more senior officials that are not directly involved in the application of the knowledge and skills being imparted, such that the impact of the training gets diluted as knowledge is passed on to others when participants complete the programme.

133. In more broad-based programmes of training such as the PIP decisions, arguably care in the selection of beneficiaries is even more critical given the scope and level of investments in capacity-building efforts. The PIP dealt with differences in prevailing capacity across beneficiary countries by adapting its programme of support; the blend and intensity of support provided to the horticultural sector in Kenya was quite different to that employed in Uganda. At the level of individual firms, in many ways beneficiaries were self-selecting; they had to apply for support (although often with support and encouragement from the PIP and local service providers). Thus, firms without minimum levels of capacity were, in effect, excluded. Administratively, this was easier for the PIP and arguably more effective at separating those who would/would not benefit from support.

### ***Establishing local capacity-building capacity***

134. One of the key elements of good practice in the PIP was the level of effort and investment in local capacity to deliver training and consultancy services to beneficiaries. Thus, while international

consultants were used initially in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, over time a critical body of local private service providers was established through training and the provision of materials. These private service providers were then included on the list of approved consultants from which firms receiving PIP support could be selected. In all three countries, the capacity-building needs of exporters can now be met locally, while training and other services have been adapted to local circumstances. In the case of capacity-building among smallholders, for example, it is suggested that such local service producers are better positioned to communicate, not only because of their command of the local language but also appreciation of cultural issues.

135. Alongside the development of local private service providers, the PIP has developed a large body of training materials, guides, etc. These translate relatively complex concepts, for example associated with GAP, into simple language that potential beneficiaries find easier to understand and apply to their own circumstances. Such materials represent a legacy of the PIP that can be employed well beyond the end of the project. The one concern about such materials, however, is the scope for them to become outdated. Here, local institutions will play a key role in the future; this is seen as one of the roles of the task forces supported by PIP in each of the beneficiary countries.

### *Sequencing and connectivity of capacity-building efforts*

136. Critical to the efficacy and sustainability of capacity-building efforts is the sequencing of and interconnectivities of capacity-building efforts. The case studies examined above present examples of challenges as much as good practice in this regard. Thus, one of the frustrations faced by beneficiaries of the PIP was the inability of the project to support capital investments or the costs of staff. While this may be deemed appropriate, it is apparent that the efficacy of some of the support provided by the PIP was compromised somewhat by the inability of beneficiaries to gain access to finance from elsewhere, whether another programme of technical cooperation or the banking sector. If the PIP had been able to coordinate its activities with other donors and/or financial institutions such constraints might have been alleviated. Likewise, some participants in the Global Salm-Surv training programme expressed frustration that they had been unable to apply the skills acquired through the project because of weak laboratory facilities in their home country.

137. A parallel problem is the scope for different technical cooperation projects to overlap and/or build capacity out of sequence. For instance, capacity assessments addressing food safety were carried out by FAO, UNIDO and/or DANIDA in the case study countries. Such overlaps enhance the transaction costs faced by beneficiaries in dealing with multiple donors and can lead to duplication of efforts that waste scarce funds for technical cooperation. The case studies do not provide any clues on how to address this problem. At the same time, we might expect the cumulative impact of the case study projects, alongside other programmes of technical cooperation, to have been significant. There is a need to recognize this and to make efforts to assess such impacts. Yet, this creates challenges for performance evaluations of individual projects; it may be difficult to separate out their individual impacts while their cumulative effects are significant.

### *Assessing and monitoring progress*

138. While much technical cooperation is focused on enhancing specific aspects of SPS capacity, often at particular levels of the hierarchy in Figure 1, underlying such objectives is often higher-level impacts, for example on the value of exports, inclusion of smallholders, etc. A multi-tiered structure of intended impacts is appropriate for most programmes of technical cooperation, especially if they are of limited duration, impacts are lagged and/or attribution problems are significant. Thus, both the PIP and EAPIC had multiple objectives that related both to specific enhancements in SPS capacity and impacts on trade. While the former can be quite closely monitored and attributed to project interventions, the latter are more aspirational and difficult to directly attribute, but can serve as guiding principles in the design and implementation of project interventions. Across all of the defined impacts it is critical that projects are realistic about what can be achieved given levels of prevailing

capacity; it is better that interventions are successful in achieving a little than unsuccessful in achieving a lot. The mid-term review of the PIP highlighted how projects have a tendency to offer too much and the need for more realistic goals.

139. Alongside the selection of multi-tiered and appropriate impact measures, it is critical that beneficiaries are able to monitor and assess their own capacity development. In the case of the PIP, individual firms defined their own work programmes in conjunction with consultants and could monitor progress over time. With the Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety, participants were provided with the opportunity to reconvene six months after the formal training programme had concluded and were provided with feedback on their national action plans. With networks such as the EAPIC and Global Salm-Surv training programme, countries can benchmark their own capacity and progress against one another.

#### ***Role as honest broker***

140. While there is a tendency to focus on the direct impacts of technical cooperation projects and programmes on the enhancement of SPS capacity and the financial investments that are being made, in some cases one of their most profound functions is as honest broker and/or risk taker. Thus, donors and project implementers, as (often) trusted, respected and/or powerful external parties, can act to overcome entrenched positions and to build bridges between stakeholders (for example across the public and private sectors). This is particularly important where fundamental institutional change and/or relocation of resources is needed, or where there is a history that needs to be overcome. The support of task forces by the PIP presents an example of good practice in this regard; the fact that the PIP was engaged with these institutions rendered legitimacy and made them safe for stakeholders who resisted engagement.

#### ***Market distortions***

141. Almost inevitably technical cooperation projects and programmes not only create demands for capacity-building and support services but also distort markets for such services. When prevailing levels of capacity and market demand are low, external support is often critical to lay down basic and broad-based functions that avoid sequencing problems in establishing higher-level SPS functions. This is seen, for example, with the development of private service providers in Kenya and Uganda, where PIP support has been critical in the face of little or no commercial demand. At the same time, donor support can act to inflate market prices – crowding out genuine market demand – and inflating demand among beneficiaries that do not bear the consequences should capacity-building efforts fail and/or the markets they supply do not demand such services.

142. Although the PIP has undoubtedly had some distorting effect on markets for private support services, it also presents examples of good practice in this regard. Thus, the fact that all assistance to exporters is on a cost-sharing basis has served to ensure that beneficiaries have a stake in the investments made by the PIP. Likewise, linking support to agreed action plans and not releasing further tranches of funds until agreed milestones have been met means that beneficiaries have to demonstrate progress.

#### ***Political support***

143. Critical to the success and longer-term sustainability of capacity-building efforts is buy-in by political decisions-makers. Where awareness and appreciation of the need for capacity enhancement is missing, necessary institutional change can be impeded and the financial allocations required to operate and maintain capacity are less likely to be made. Engaging beneficiary countries in assessing the design and implementation of capacity-building efforts can be important in this regards, provided these involve decision-makers at a sufficiently high level. Dissemination of information, including through the media, can also act to create the political impetus to move SPS issues further up the

agenda. The PIP provides an example of good practice in engendering political support for its work. Key here has been the establishment and/or enhancement of task forces involving the public and private sectors, dissemination of timely and reliable information and engaging with the media.

144. The Capacity-Building Needs Assessment project illustrates the importance of garnering political support once needs assessments have been concluded and the challenges faced by technical cooperation programmes in doing so. The use of national stakeholder consultations provides an example of good practice in this regard; while this project was fundamentally driven by FAO, although with some buy-in on the part of the beneficiary countries, these consultations enabled stakeholders to have some influence on the content and format of the resulting action plans. The fact that the needs assessments were tied to action plans, and governments were encouraged to adopt these plans, provided a platform for political support for capacity-building efforts into the future and accountability.

## ANNEX I - DESCRIPTION OF CASE STUDY PROJECTS

### *Pesticides Initiatives Programme*

The Pesticides Initiatives Programme (PIP) had four key components:

1. *Information and communication component*, designed to help enterprises and the ACP and EU institutions to keep abreast of the European market quality requirements, such as the efforts made by ACP producers and exporters. Its activities focused on:
  - Implementation of a communication strategy, calling on regional and local relays, to provide the information required for the proactiveness of the PIP target groups;
  - Implementation of a centralised system via Internet to communicate with the local relays.
2. *Regulation component* aimed at setting new MRLs/IT reflecting Good Agricultural Practice for minor crops in tropical areas and fostering adaptation of the regulation. Its activities focused on:
  - Identification through an iterative process of consultation/validation of the priority product/active ingredients pairs;
  - Definition and validation of the experimentation protocols;
  - Proposals for ways to adjust the ACP national plant health regulations.

The methodology, divided into three main phases, was developed as the project progressed:

- *Drafting of a crop protocol including the Good Agricultural Practice (GAP)*
  - Selection of the main crops from the most economically important ones;
  - In-field survey to find out about the pests, the agricultural practice of a sample of representative enterprises and to determine the active substances they use, the doses employed, the frequency of use and the time before harvest;
  - Selection of the active substances with DG SANCO, the EU's residues group, the pesticide manufacturers and the research institutes;
  - Drafting of a complete crop protocol for the preparation of the soil through to the intermediate storage via the application of the pesticides. Each pest or disease is treated by at least two active ingredients.
- *Field trials:*
  - Definition of the most representative ecological zones;
  - Choice of several combinations of active substances;
  - Validation of the choice by the pesticide manufacturers, DG SANCO and the research institutes;

- Monitoring of the protocols given to the local private enterprises;
  - Analyses of the residues done in European laboratories certified for good practice. The costs of the trials and analyses are to be charged to the PIP.
- *Presentation of cases to obtain an import tolerance*
    - Analysis of the results of the residues to determine if there is a need to ask for an import tolerance application for an active substance/crop pair;
    - Development of the IT application with the pesticides manufacturer that possessed the molecule. The expenses linked to the file are to be paid by the molecules manufacturer;
    - Assessment of the file by a Member State Rapporteur;
3. *Good company practice component*, aimed at helping ACP enterprises in their efforts to adjust, upgrade and certify their practice. Its activities focused on:
- Development of common frameworks by crop;
  - Training of the producers and conditioners, leading to a process of validation (audit and certification);
  - Information to European buyers and consumers;
  - Demand-driven assistance, for cost sharing, for the enterprises.
4. *Organization and capacity-building component*, aimed at helping the structuring of the sector and the local capacity building of the different ACP actors. Here activities focused on setting up national task forces, working closely with small-scale and medium-scale producers, that would act as representatives of the Programme Management Unit and as a framework for public/private consultation and the implementation of some functions (to be defined by the national task forces) carried out at regional level and in all ACP countries by appropriate structures that were representative of the private sector.

Some of the key elements of PIP's activities in the two study countries are as follows:

#### *Kenya*

The PIP trained company staff so that they would carry through the implement food safety systems. This training was undertaken collectively where food safety, production and pack-house managers from different companies participated in workshops on the various aspects of food safety. A total of 179 Participants were trained using eight training modules designed by the PIP.

A total of 30 companies in Kenya took part in in-company training sessions involving team leaders, field assistants and lead farmers. This training took place at each company's production sites and was provided by trained trainers and consultants. The training covered topics such as hygiene, safe use of pesticides, safe production practices and internal auditing procedures.

The PIP supported exporting firms to implement food safety systems that complied with EU requirements and the setting-up of traceability systems (paper or computerised) where possible, following actions defined in each company's memorandum of understanding (MoU) and action plan drawn up with PIP. Follow-ups were undertaken by trained consultants. Companies which decided to

use traceability software had the option of using a package developed by the PIP. In total, 14 Kenyan companies received support on traceability.

The PIP also supported around 40 local companies and consultants who provide training and advisory services. The training these received was aimed at making affordable services available to Kenyan producers and reducing the need for foreign experts and certification bodies.

The Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) co-ordinated the development of KenyaGAP, which was launched on 29 July 2007, with significant PIP support. This was a major milestone for Kenya's horticulture sector and affirmed its role as a leading supplier of high quality products to international markets. KenyaGAP was the first comprehensive quality assurance scheme in Africa, covering fruits, vegetables and flowers, to acquire EurepGap/GlobalGap equivalence. It was also unique in that it incorporated the specific needs and concerns of small-scale farming methods.

The PIP also supported marketing and information dissemination activities through FPEAK. It provided funding for FPEAK to participate in regional trade shows in Kenya and the Fruit Logistica fair in Berlin. In addition, there was a protocol between PIP and FPEAK for print press promotion of issues relevant to the horticultural sector in Kenya.

The PIP was instrumental in the development of the National Task Force on Horticulture, which evolved out of the Maximum Residue Levels Steering Committee initially established by the Ministry of Agriculture. The secretariat of the task force is based at FPEAK and has received significant financial and administrative support from the PIP. The task force holds regular issue-based meetings where all stakeholders in the sector discuss local and international challenges facing Kenya's horticulture sector. Other countries in the region have tried to emulate the National Task Force on Horticulture, seeing it as an effective instrument for addressing broad challenges facing the sector. For example, the task force had been instrumental in Kenya's response to ongoing debates about 'food miles' and consequences for exports of fresh produce from Kenya.

The PCPB has compiled a list of approved pesticides in Kenya with the assistance of PIP that indicates the specific uses for each approved active substance. The approved pesticide list is updated every three months.

Laboratory testing capacity in Kenya has been enhanced with the support of the PIP. Notably, the PIP has provided training on analytical procedures, and supported pre-audits and audits towards certification to ISO 17025, notably in the Kenya Plant Health Inspection Service (KEPHIS) laboratory. The PIP did not, however, provide funding for capital investments towards the upgrading of laboratory facilities.

Through PIP's assistance, Kenya's horticulture sector has successfully engaged with the EU on compliance issues relating to pesticides and MRLs. Thus, support was provided to KEPHIS for the testing of MRLs levels for certain active substances in passion fruit and green beans following efficacy trials among smallholder farmers. As a result, 'realistic' MRLs could be defined that could be presented to the European Commission.

PIP has had a positive impact on the capacity of the Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) in its work with smallholders. In particular, it has supported the development of courses and materials for the training of small-scale farmers.

#### *Uganda*

In Uganda, PIP supported the training of 19 exporting companies in Uganda, which have signed MoUs. Training has been provided on implementation of food safety systems, organic certification, traceability, etc. As a collective level, the PIP has worked with firms in the flower sector on the

development of training modules that are based around training materials developed by the PIP. Once firms engaged with the PIP have received training and are ready to implement their food safety systems, support has been provided by local consultants to guide the implementation process.

The PIP has given support to smallholder producers engaged in the production of fresh produce for export. Thus, it supported the creation of ten producer groups for training in IPM and supporting one produce in his efforts to achieve certification among his out-growers. More than 100 producers and out-growers received training on IPM.

Support has been provided for the establishment of a national task force, the Task Force for Responding to the EU Export Market Requirements, as a forum to address the challenges faced by the Ugandan horticultural sector. The PIP provided support to the task force in a number of areas, notably providing a representative to work part-time in the task force's secretariat, contributing to the costs of information campaigns to foster awareness on EU requirements by key stakeholders and other actions required to develop a national food safety system.

The PIP supported a private laboratory (Chemiphar) to enhance its capacity for pesticide residue analysis of fruits and vegetables and achieving accreditation to ISO 17025.

The Agricultural Chemicals Board (ACB) is the Ugandan body responsible for the registration, labelling, and regulation of imports and exports of agricultural pesticides. The PIP provided assistance towards upgrading of the pesticide approval process skills of the registrar and registration officers in the evaluation of dossiers submitted for registration of pesticides. It also advised MAAIF towards ensuring that Uganda's pesticide policy and regulatory framework is harmonized with EU regulations.

#### ***East Africa Phytosanitary Information Committee***

The East Africa Phytosanitary Information Committee (EAPIC) was formed in Nairobi in April 2006 during a pest risk assessment meeting of the East African National Plant Protection Organization (NPPOs). The EAPIC emerged, in part, out of the realisation that the capacity of developing countries to meet IPPC mandates for the provision of information on plant pests and diseases was constrained by poor infrastructure and information capture and management systems.

The project is developing a regional plant pest database for agricultural pest information that will help prioritize SPS issues/strategies in individual NPPOs and facilitate regional and international trade. The data will be shared among the EAPIC, consisting of NPPOs in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, and representatives of the AU and COMESA. The committee aims systematically to develop pest reporting methods/protocols and internet-based databases in support of SPS requirements for East Africa that are compliant with IPPC protocols and to help countries in the region prioritise plant pest activities with respect to diagnosis, surveillance, detection, reporting and inspection. Thus the project aims to develop a framework that underpins all other regionally-based SPS activities, including harmonization of border inspection protocols.

So far the project has set up separate servers in project member countries, which will be linked to a regional server at KEPHIS in Kenya. While Tanzania and Uganda have faced problems due to power cuts and weak and expensive internet access, they now have their servers running.

The project has created partnerships and, working within organizations at the technical, managerial and policy levels, brought together a mixture of experts. For example, at the last meeting in Lusaka in April 21-25, 2008, the project invited high level government officials and managers to signal their commitment to the project. The meeting also provided an opportunity for regional economic communities, such as SADC and COMESA, and other stakeholders to create awareness of their activities and their role in the EAPIC.

The project has also been training NPPO personnel, particularly in database management. The project will soon appoint a programme manager to be funded by FAO for two years. One of this person's key roles will be to prioritise training with EAPIC.

Since the project started, a list covering 2300 pests and diseases has been established. Further, Kenya has obtained approval for the export of three fresh products to the United States on the basis of pest risk assessments prepared and submitted with help from the EAPIC.

### ***Capacity-Building Needs Assessment***

This project resulted from an FAO/WHO Regional Conference on Food Safety for Africa, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 2005. The action plan from the conference recommended that FAO should "lead a diagnostic study of the regional food safety situation in order to determine the most urgent regional needs and priority areas for improvement". At the same time, FAO was developing tools to assist national food control agencies to assess their capacity building needs in the area of food safety as part of its capacity building activities.

The Assessment of Capacity Building Needs of the Food Control System was conducted in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda by three local consultants coordinated by one international consultant. This assessment followed procedures stipulated in one of the need assessments tools created by FAO, namely Strengthening National Food Control Systems: A Quick Guide to Assess Capacity Building. Thus it had the dual purpose of testing the effectiveness of the guide and assessing the capacity-building needs in food safety and quality of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as Laos and Cambodia. This work was funded by the Norwegian government within the FAO/Government of Norway Programme Cooperation Agreement and formed part of the FAO project FNOP/INT/103/NOR B2 Objective 1: 'Improved Food Safety and Quality at the National Level and Along the Food Chain.' The focus of this project was to identify the main components of the national food control system in each country and use the guide to evaluate the capacity of food safety systems in the countries.

The capacity-building needs assessment guide was successfully applied in the three countries and a draft report, including a detailed action plan prepared. Subsequently, a stakeholder consultation was held in each country at which feedback was obtained and an agreed final version of the action plan for each country was adopted by the government. Since these action plans were agreed, FAO has made efforts to engage with the three country governments towards the implementation of the action plans. To date this engagement has progressed most in Tanzania, where existing plans towards the reform of food safety capacity were already in existence. At the time of this survey, engagement with the Kenyan government had been largely put on hold due to political turmoil in the country.

### ***Advanced Training Programme on Quality Infrastructure for Food Safety***

The main objectives of the three week training were:

- To expose practitioners from developing countries to international standards on good practice
- Train them on systematic development of food safety policies.
- Allow these practitioners to go back to guide development of food quality and safety systems and policies in their countries and promote it among the relevant stakeholders in their countries.

The team from Uganda was made up of four members; two members from the Ministry of Agriculture, one member from the Ministry of Health and one member from the Uganda National

Bureau of Standards (UNBS). Tanzania was represented by four members, one each from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFSC), Department of Fisheries, Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) and Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC). Upon completion of the SWEDAC training the trained officials returned to their country and worked for six months on a policy document draft which they later presented at workshop in Nairobi in August 2007.

***Global Salm-Surv training programme on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-Borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa***

The WHO Global Salm-Surv (WHO-GSS training course on Laboratory-Based Surveillance of Food-borne Diseases for Anglophone Central and Eastern Africa was mounted in Kenya from 29 October to 2 November, 2007. It was initiated by WHO after a Global Salm-Surv Strategic meeting in Nyon, Switzerland in May 2007 by WHO-GSS steering committee partners. The curriculum was developed and revised for the regional context by a WHO expert in Africa. Pathogens chosen for the course were non-typhoidal *Salmonella* and *Vibrio Cholerae*. The course offered laboratory work and theoretical training. Basic concepts about laboratory-based surveillance and practical case study were undertaken.

***Study on Costs of Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea***

This study was undertaken at a cost of US\$18,000 in Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea to identify and quantify the costs of compliance with SPS standards faced by exports of tropical products. The study was initiated in 2004 and completed in 2006, following an UNCTAD expert meeting on market access at which Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea requested standards-related assistance. In Tanzania, the World Bank took charge of the study with the intention that estimates of costs of compliance would be derived and actions recommended to build capacity, particularly for EurepGAP/GlobalGAP compliance in production and distribution systems in Tanzania. The study, which involved producers, exporters, business bodies, enterprises and institutions, identified both 'macro' and 'micro' costs of compliance. Macro costs included public and semi-public expenditures (for example training, infrastructure and equipment upgrading, inspection, testing, etc), while micro costs included set up and recurrent costs borne by companies (for example purchase of equipment, training, implementation of management systems, etc). The study also developed a comprehensive set of tools which can be used by the private and public sectors to test and improve food safety control systems. A national workshop was held in Tanzania based on the findings from the three countries.

## ANNEX II - ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRES

In order to gauge the impact of training, the trainers carried out assessment to determine the extent to which the course impacted the skills and knowledge level of participants. A summary of the responses to completed questionnaires is provided below in Table 1.

**Table 1. Summary of questionnaire responses**

Activity	PROJECT			
	EAPIC	WHO	SWEDAC	UNCTAD
<b>Project Design</b>				
Project type	Pilot	Ongoing	Pilot	Pilot
What the project sought to address	Plant health	Food Safety	Animal Health Food safety Plant health General SPS capacity	General SPS capacity
Project initiator	Donor identified need Request from beneficiary	International organization	Donor identified need Request from beneficiary	Request from beneficiary
Project designer	Donor and beneficiary collaboration	Donor and beneficiary collaboration	Donor and beneficiary collaboration	Donor
Needs assessment done?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Needs assessment for specific need done?	No	No	No	No
Needs assessment as part of a broader assessment of needs?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Consideration of relevant ongoing or completed projects	Designed as a follow up to other previous donors	Designed as a follow up to other previous donors	Pilot project	Pilot project
Enough time given to preparation of project?	60-80%	80-100%	60-80%	80-100%

Activity	PROJECT			
	EAPIC	WHO	SWEDAC	UNCTAD
Beneficiaries consulted during project preparation	National plant protection organizations FAO COMESA African Union Centre for Integrated Pest Management	Trainers from beneficiary countries	Content of programme presented to a regional institution relevant to the programme	Public and private sector through a national workshop
<b>Implementation</b>				
Who implemented the project?	Donor	Beneficiaries (trainers and participants from 10 African countries)	Independent contractor Beneficiaries	World Bank
Extent of beneficiary participation project implementation?	60-80%	40-60%	80-100%	-
Specific role of beneficiary in project implementation	Meetings venues, Developing meeting agendas, objectives Developed pest list protocols	Local organizations acted as trainers Arranged training facilities and accommodation	Participation in 4 weeks training Nine month-national project Workshop presentations	-
Difficulties with beneficiaries during implementation	Resources to purchase servers	No	No	-
Responsibility for monitoring project	Donor Beneficiary	Beneficiary International organization	Independent contractor	World Bank
Extent to which project met objectives, timelines and budgets	80-100%	80-100%	60-80%	-

Activity	PROJECT			
	EAPIC	WHO	SWEDAC	UNCTAD
Changes made during the project	Objectives of meetings adjusted to progress	None	None	-
Who requested changes project changes?	Donor Beneficiary	None	None	-
<b>Evaluation</b>				
Evaluation	No; peer evaluations as groups met and discussed	Yes	Yes	-
To what extent project continued after funding?	80-100%	60-80%	60-80%	-
To what extent beneficiaries can sustain project?	80-100%	60-80%	40-60%	-
Was capacity for sustainability assessed in project design?	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
<b>Outputs</b>				
Extent to which outputs were achieved	80-100%	80-100%	40-60%	80-100%
Factors determining outputs	Commitment by NPPOs and institutions, Dialogues and troubleshoot-ing in meetings	Good course content Appropriate time allocation to lectures and presentations Laboratory exercises	Lack of time Lack of local funding	Local commitment through the national workshop
Achievement of higher-order objectives	Yes	No	No	Don't know

Activity	PROJECT			
	EAPIC	WHO	SWEDAC	UNCTAD
<b>Outputs (continued)</b>				
Specific higher-order objectives achieved	Institutional capacity of NPPOs Harmonization of pest lists to decreased pest and disease burden	Long term institutional capacity of public health institutions	-	-
<b>Good Practice</b>				
Project cycle	Collaboration between donors and beneficiaries	Collaboration between donors and beneficiaries	-	An initial study is a good basis for a project Dissemination of country needs through the workshop
Achievement of higher-order objectives	Decreasing pests and diseases Harmonising border inspections Market access Regional collaboration	Help enhance laboratory based surveillance and Food-borne diseases Improved food safety will enhance market access	The programme filled a gap on SPS knowledge capacity at a national level Pilot project for East African countries to create a national platform for SPS issues Provided tools for policy planning	-

Activity	PROJECT			
	EAPIC	WHO	SWEDAC	UNCTAD
Replicable aspects of good practice	Long term objectives Internet based databases Harmonization of SPS border controls	Joint planning, designing Joint implementation	A holistic policy approach to SPS issues Based on policy action plans can be identified for intervention	Organization of workshops for greater dissemination of information
Extent to which project was cost effective	80-100%	80-100%	60-80%	80-100%

## **ANNEX III - IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE**

### **Standards and Trade Development Facility Good Practice in SPS-related Technical Cooperation Country-level Follow-up Research**

#### **Project Design**

1. What elements of good practice were there in the design phase of this project?
  - How was the project initiated?
  - What role did beneficiary's have in initiating and/or designing the project
  - How did priorities in national development strategies feed into the initiation and/or design of the project?
  - What use was made of needs assessment in the initiation and/or design of the project?
  - To what degree was there local and/or regional political support for the project? How was this assessed and facilitated?
  - How were the goals of the project articulated? How clearly?
  - What were the objectives of the project?
  - What indicators were specified to assess the degree to which these objectives were achieved?
  - What synergies existed with completed and/or ongoing activities in the same area?
  - How was the potential sustainability of the capacity developed by the project assessed
  - How much attention was given to the sustainability of the capacity developed in the project design?

#### **Implementation**

2. What elements of good practice were there in the implementation phase of this project?
  - To what degree was their local ownership? How was this promoted?
  - To what degree were beneficiaries involved in the implementation of the project? How was this promoted?
  - To what degree was the private sector involved in implementing the project? How was this promoted?
  - What partnerships were established with beneficiaries, other donors, etc. as part of the implementation of the project?
  - What flexibility existed in the project to address unforeseen challenges and/or circumstances?
  - What synergies existed with other related activities, including by other agencies, donors, etc?
  - How was the project and its anticipated outcomes communicated within and/or outside of the beneficiary country?
  - How was the project managed? What challenges were faced in this?

#### **Project Outputs**

3. What elements of good practice were there in the project outputs?
  - What were the expected outcomes of the project? How were these defined? How were they monitored and/or assessed?
  - To what extent did the project deliver the expected outcomes? How was this assessed?

- What factors influenced the delivery of these outcomes?
- Were there any unexpected issues that constrained the ability of the project to deliver the defined outcomes?
- Were there any unexpected outcomes, either positive or negative?

### **Project Impact**

4. What elements of good practice can be identified with respect to the impact of the project?
  - Did the project have the anticipated impacts on the beneficiary country and/or stakeholders therein?
  - What was the project's contribution to achievement of higher-order objectives:
    - Improved market access
    - Enhanced animal/plant health status.
    - Income generation.
    - Poverty alleviation.
    - Reduced incidence of food-borne diseases.
  - Were any systematic evaluations undertaken of the impacts of the project?
  - What more circumstantial/informal evidence is there of the impacts of the project?
  - What factors beyond the project have influenced (positively or negatively) the impacts of the project?

### **Good Practice**

5. Overall, what are the key lessons for good practices in SPS capacity building which emerge from this project?
  - To what extent do beneficiaries consider the project to be an example of good practice?
  - To what extent were particular aspects of the project design or implementation innovative?
  - To what extent did the project make a cost-effective contribution towards achieving the objectives set?
  - What experiences or lessons from the project could be replicated by other technical assistance activities inside or outside the country?
  - Are there any examples of the project, or elements of it, being replicated elsewhere? What specific examples do you have?
  - If the project were to be done again, what do you consider should be done differently?

**ANNEX IV - PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN STUDY COUNTRIES**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>INSTITUTION</b>
<b>TANZANIA</b>		
Ms Analice Anatol Kamala	Officer	Tanzania Food Nutrition Centre Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Mr Benny Gratton Rushunju	Officer	Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Mr Hosea Gonza Mbilinyi	Deputy Director	Ministry Of Natural Resources And Tourism, Fisheries Division Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
Mr Didas Mutamingwa	Manager, Quality Management	Tanzania Food And Drugs Authority, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
Mr Faustine Masaga	Chief Standards Officer	Tanzania Bureau Of Standards, Dar Es Salaam Tanzania
<b>UGANDA</b>		
Nsimbe Bulega	Principal Fisheries Inspector	Department Of Fisheries Resources Ministry Of Agriculture, Animal Industry And Fisheries, Entebbe Uganda
Mr Michael Kawalya	Export Quality And Production Manager	Icemark Africa Ltd, Kampala Uganda
Mr James Kanyije	Managing Director	Icemark Africa Ltd, Kampala Uganda
Mr Musa Kuggudu Muwanga	Coordinator	National Organic Agricultural Movement Of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda
Ms Irene Wanyenya	Senior Certification Officer	Uganda National Bureau Of Standards, Kampala, Uganda
Ms Proscovia Nankya	Director	Agro-Consultants, Kampala Uganda
Mr Umran Kagwa	Horticulture Advisor	Agribusiness Management Associated Ltd, Kampala Uganda
Mr Fred Ssango	Rural Development Specialist	Agribusiness Management Associated Ltd, Kampala Uganda
Mr Abdulkarim Farid Karama	Managing Director	Sulma Foods Limited, Kampala Uganda
Dr Francis Ejobi	Professor And Head Of Department	Department Of Preventive Medicine And Public Health, University Of Makerere, Kampala, Uganda
Mr Patrick Mulabe	Production Coordinator	Biofresh Uganda, Kampala Uganda
Dr. Robert Karyeiya	Principal Agricultural Inspector	Crop Protection Department, Ministry Of Agriculture, Animal Industry And Fisheries, Entebbe Uganda
<b>KENYA</b>		
Mrs Ruth Nyagah	Managing Director	Africert, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr Kang'ethe Njuguma	General Manager	Ansa Horticultural Exports, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Kinyua Murimi	Plant Pathologist	Kenya Agriculture Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr Simon Maina	Managing Director	Myner Exports Ltd. Nairobi, Kenya

NAME	TITLE	INSTITUTION
<b>Kenya (continued)</b>		
Dr Lloyd Garcia	Regional Sps Advisor	Us. Agency For International Development East Africa, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr Francis Wario	Agronomist	Fresh Produce Association Of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Washington Otieno	General Manager, Phytosanitary Services	Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr Esther Kimani	Head, Phytosanitary Services	Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr Ephraim Muriuki	Managing Director	Wamu Investments, Nairobi, Kenya
Mrs Nancy Gitonga	Consultant	Fish Africa, Nairobi, Kenya
Mr Robert Sanaya	Assistant Research Officer	Centre For Microbiology Research, Kemri, Nairobi Kenya
Mr Jason Kamunya,	Training Manager	Homegrown, Nairobi Kenya
Mrs Margaret Mutinda-	Technical Administrator	Homegrown, Nairobi Kenya
Mrs Susan Wasike	Regional Training Manager	Homegrown, Nairobi Kenya
Mr Christopher Nzuki	Assistant Out Grower Manager	Homegrown, Nairobi Kenya
Mr John Simone	Out Grower Manager	Homegrown, Nairobi Kenya
Mr Mathew Munyau	Out Grower Manager	Homegrown, Nairobi Kenya

## ANNEX V - LITERATURE CITED OR USED

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